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I Introduction
This Article addresses some of the issues that arise when nonparents seek
visitation with other peoples' children. More often than not, natural parents
successfully resist assertions of child visitation rights by legal strangers such
as stepparents and so-called lesbian "coparents."' However, grandparents,
aided by a raft of legislation and judicial decisions, fare infinitely better
* Sidney and Walter SibenDistinguished ProfessorofFamily Law, HofstraUniversity.
I thank Janet L. Dolgin, Jay Geiger, Lawrence W. Kessler, Robert J. Levy, Linda McClain, and
the participants in a Hofstra Law School faculty workshop for comments on an earlier draft.
I am grateful to Ann Driscoll for assistance in preparing this article and to Philip Berkowitz,
Jeffrey Brown, Andrea Langszner, Michelle Mini, and Marie Noury for research during its
development. I also thank Liz Carretta for the application of her superb secretarial skills and
occasional legal research. An earlier version of this article was presented at the International
Society of Family Law, North American Regional Conference (June 13-15, 1996). I thank the
participants for their comments.
1. See infra Part II (discussing legal response to third party visitation claims).
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when petitioning for visitation with their grandchildren. This Article dis-
cusses the current law and legal scholarship concerning visitation rights of
legal strangers and concludes that courts and legislatures should support legal
parents' rights to raise their children without unwanted interference from legal
strangers.
Legislative enactments that deal explicitly with visitation by third parties
do not provide uniform or clear standards reflecting the circumstances under
which visitation claims will be honored. However, the statutes generally
reflect the requirement, whether express or implicit, that visitation be in the
best interests of the child. By and large, courts have adopted the same stan-
dard in third party visitation cases.
Against this background, some commentators have proposed changes in
the law of third party visitation that would redefine parent and family to give
legal recognition to relationships between children and third parties. These
proposals would treat third parties and natural parents identically in visitation
cases. This Article rejects these proposals on constitutional and policy
grounds. Instead, the decisions of fit natural parents concerning who may
visit their children should be controlling, absent a showing of significant harm
or danger to the child. This position finds support in long standing and highly
cherished traditional views about family autonomy and its concomitant,
parental authority.
Part H examines the current law relating to third party visitation claims
by "coparents", stepparents, grandparents, and foster parents. Part III dis-
cusses scholarship critical of the current bases for legal recognition of parental
status. Finally, Part IV proposes adoption of a third party visitation standard
grounded in family autonomy and parental authority that respects the child
rearing decisions of fit natural parents in the absence of a showing of harm to
the child.
II. The Law's Response to Third Party Visitation Claims
4. "Coparents"
The New York Court of Appeals's 1991 decision inAlison D. v. Virginia
M 2 inspired the writing of this Article.3 Two years after Alison D. and
Virginia M. established a relationship and began living together, they decided
to have a child and agreed that Virginia M. would be artificially inseminated.4
2. 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
3. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991).
4. Id. at 28. A number of writers have urged that the term artificial insemination be
abandoned and replaced by "alternative insemination." I decline to do so. Professor Nancy D.
Polikoff uses the new term, calling it "a more appropriate description of the procedure com-
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The parties also agreed to share the rights and responsibilities of child
rearing.5 Virginia M. gave birth to a baby boy, who was given both Alison
D.'s and Virginia M.'s surnames.6 Alison D. shared in the expenses relating
to the child's birth, provided support, participated with Virginia M. in child
care, and was active in making parental decisions!
The parties separated when the child was 2 years and 4 months old, and
his natural mother, Virginia M., eventually terminated Alison D's visitation.8
Alison D. then commenced a legal action seeking visitation rights.9 Affirming
lower courtdecisionsto dismissthe action,NewYork's highestcourt, the Court
of Appeals, emphasized Alison D.'s concession that she was not the child's
biological or adoptive parent." Instead, she claimed that she had acted as a
de facto parent," or that the court should view her as a parent by estoppel,1
2
monly referred to as 'artificial insemination.' Because there is nothing artificial about insemi-
nating a woman, alternative insemination aptly describes a process that is merely an alternative
to insemination through sexual intercourse." Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two
Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other
Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 467 n.24 (1990); see also Lisa M. Pooley,
Heterosexism and Children's Best Interests: Conflicting Concepts in Nancy S. v. Michele G.,
27 U.S.F. L. REV. 477, 479-80 n.14 (1993) (using term alternative insemination); Carmel B.
Sella, When a Mother Is a Legal Stranger to Her Child: The Law's Challenge to the Lesbian
Nonbiological Mother, 1 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 135, 139 n.13 (1991) (same). Professor
Ruthann Robson notes an additional reason for preferring the term alterative insemination; it
is the term preferred by many women in the lesbian community who have used the procedure.
Ruthan Robson, Third Parties and the Third Sex: Child Custody and Lesbian Legal Theory,
26 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1393 n.66 (1994). In contrast, Professor Marc E. Elovitz uses the
traditional term artificial insemination despite his preference for the new term, appropriately
noting that the traditional usage is consistent with statutes and case law. See Marc E. Elovitz,
Reforming the Law to Respect Families Created by Lesbian and Gay People, 3 J.L. & POL'Y
431, 432 n.4 (1995). A thorough search of the case law uncovered only one reported case that
actually employs the term alternative insemination. In re Camellia, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897, 899
(Fam. Ct. 1994).
5. Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 28.
6. See id. (noting that-Alison D.'s last name became child's middle name and that
Virginia M.'s last name became child's last name).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id at29 (outlining Alison D.'s claim pursuantto New York's Domestic Relations
Law).
10. Id.
11. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212,216 (Ct. App. 1991) (describing de
facto parent as one "who, on a day-to-day basis, assumes the role of parent, seeking to fulfill
both the child's physical needs and his psychological need for affection and care" (quoting In
re B.G., 523 P.2d 244,253 n.18 (Cal. 1974))).
12. See id. at 217 (explaining that some courts will resort to equitable estoppel to deny
existence of parent-child relationship previously encouraged and supported by legal parent).
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with standing to seek visitation rights. 3 Discussing the requirements and
traditional judicial interpretation of the governing statute, the court observed:
Traditionally, in this state it is the child's mother and father who, assuming
fitness, have the right to the care and custody of their child, even in situa-
tions where the nonparent has exercised some control over the child with
the parents' consent. To allow the courts to award visitation - a limited
form of custody - to a third person would necessarily impair the parents'
right to custody and control. 4
The court rejected Alison D.'s claims of parentage and of visitation rights on
this basis.'5
Judge Judith Kaye dissented sharply from the court's per curiam opin-
ion.'6 She explained that her dissent was compelled by "[t]he majority's
retreat from the court's proper role - its tightening of rules that should in
visitation petitions, above all, retain the capacity to take the children's inter-
ests into account."' 7 In particular, Judge Kaye objected to the court's finding
that the word parent in the statute governing custody referred exclusively to
a biological parent." She argued that this reading "foreclose[d] all inquiry
into the child's best interest, even in visitation proceedings" and was inconsis-
tent with the explicit legislative objective of promoting the best interest,
welfare, and happiness of the child. 9 Finally, after a brief review of the
legislative history and prior judi6ial applications of the statute, Judge Kaye
argued that the majority's literal definition of parent was inappropriate."
Judge Kaye's dissent also faulted the majority for "overlook[ing] the
significant distinction between visitation and custody proceedings."2' She
asserted that, although judicial infringement of the right to rear a child must
be based on the custodial parent's unfitness, burdens on visitation rights "must
be based on the child's overriding need to maintain a particular relation-
13. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991).
14. Id. at 29 (citations omitted). New York's Domestic Relations Law provides that
"either parent may apply to the supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor
child brought before such court; and on the return thereof, the court... may award the natural
guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent.., as the case may require."
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (a) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997-98).
15. Alison D., 572 N.E. 2d at 29-30.




.20. See id. at 31-32 (noting that it is within competence and authority of court to deter-
mine meaning of term parent and that court should have exercised that power in matter at hand).
21. Id. at31.
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ship." Judge Kaye concluded that "the fitness concern present in custody
disputes is irrelevant in visitation petitions, where continuing contact with the
child rather than severing of a parental tie is in issue."'  Judge Kaye would
have remanded the case for a determination of whether Alison D. stood in
loco parentis to the child and whether visitation would be in the child's best
interest.24
The New York Court of Appeals was neither the first court nor the last
to reject requests for visitation by lesbian former coparents. In two earlier
cases, the California Court of Appeal similarly denied visitation to women
who had been involved in homosexual relations with the natural mothers of
children conceived through artificial insemination.' After the New York
court's decision in Alison D. v. Virginia M., Wisconsin's highest court re-
jected a claim for visitation rights by lesbian former partners of legal
parents.26 Recently, however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has reconsidered
its earlier position on visitation rights for lesbian coparents, and a New
Mexico appeals court has expressed a willingness to entertain requests for
visitation rights by coparents.27
1. Judicial Rejection of "Coparent" Visitation Rights
In Curiale v. Regan,28 a mother's lesbian former partner brought suit to
enforce a purported custody agreement.29 Upon termination of their relation-
ship, the parties had executed a written agreement providing for shared
custody." The California Court of Appeal framed the issue as "whether
plaintiff, who is neither the natural mother, step-mother, nor adoptive mother
22. I
23. Id. at 32.
24. Id. at 33.
25. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991) (concluding
that nonbiological lesbian coparent could not establish existence of legally cognizable parent-
child relationship); Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 522-23 (Ct. App. 1990) (deciding
plaintiff lacked standing to assert visitation or custody claim against former partner); see also
West v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr. 2d 160, 162-64 (Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize
standing of lesbian former coparent) (citing Curiale, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 521-22).
26. See In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 212 (Wis. 1991) (concluding that law
did not entitle plaintiff to establish existence of legally recognizable parent-child relationship),
overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995).
27. See H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421 (stating that trial courts have equitable power to
find parent-like relationship); see also A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-64 (N.M. Ct. App.
1992) (remanding case for determination of best interests of child).
28. 272 Cal. Rptr. 520 (Ct. App. 1990).
29. Curiale v. Reagan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521 (Ct. App. 1990).
30. Id.
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of the child has standing to assert a claim for custody and/or visitation as
against the child's natural mother with whom the child resides."'" The court
found that no statutory or decisional authority existed to afford visitation over
the objections of a natural parent, and the court refused to award the plaintiff
visitation rights.32
In Nancy S. v. Michele G.,33 the California Court of Appeal heard an
appeal in a case with facts similar to those that faced the New York Court of
Appeals inAlison D.34 Nancy S. was seeking partial custody of the biological
children of her lesbian former partner.35 The court noted that under Califor-
nia's Uniform Parentage Act, a court may not award custody to a nonparent
without the parents' consent, unless the court finds that parental custody would
be detrimental to the child and that an award to a nonparent would serve the
child's best interests.36 The court further explained that only the natural or
adoptive parent of a child is a parent under the Uniform Parentage Act.37
Because Nancy S. was neither the children's natural nor adoptive parent,
nor was she married to the mother, she could not establish a parent-child
relationship that would entitle her to visitation under California law. 8 The
court also found that Nancy S. failed to establish standing through alternative
theories, including de facto parenthood, the in loco parentis doctrine, and
equitable estoppel.39 First, the court rejected her assertion of de facto parent-
hood, explaining that only clear and convincing evidence that parental custody
was detrimental to the child would justify an award to a de facto parent."
Second, the court noted that the in loco parentis doctrine had never been
applied to give a nonparent the same status as a parent and declined to extend
that theory.4' Finally, the court refused to apply the equitable estoppel doc-
trine to prevent the natural mother "from denying the existence of a parent-
child relationship that she allegedly encouraged and supported for many years
and which she now denies for the sole purpose of obtaining unfettered control
over the custody of the children."'42
31. Id. at521.
32. Id. at 522-23.
33. 279 Cal. Rptr. 212 (Ct. App. 1991).
34. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 214 (Ct. App. 1991) (describing
case's factual background).
35. Id
36. Id. at 214-15; see CAL. FAM. CODE § 3041 (West 1994).
37. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215; see CAL. CIV. CODE § 7601 (West 1994).
38. Nancy S., 279 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
39. Id. at 215-16.
40. Id. at 216.
41. Id. at 217.
42. Id.
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Judicial refusal to recognize visitation rights for former partners of
lesbian mothers continued after the New York court's decision in Alison D.
In In re Interest of ZJ.H.,43 Wendy L. Sporleder sought visitation with the
adopted child of her former partner." The Supreme Court of Wisconsin
refused to recognize a coparenting contract between Sporleder and her former
partner and refused to grant Sporleder visitation rights!'
Sporleder and her former partner, Janice Hermes, had lived together for
eight years.46 After an unsuccessful attempt at artificial insemination of
Sporleder, they decided that Hermes would adopt a child. 7 Sporleder pro-
vided primary care for the child while Hermes held ajob." Pursuant to their
coparenting contract, the parties agreed that if they separated they would
determine physical custody of the child through mediation, with the non-
custodian having liberal visitation rights 9
The parties separated after the adoption, and Hermes prevented Sporleder
from seeing the child.5" Sporleder brought an action for physical placement
or visitation and sought to enforce the coparenting agreement.5 The family
court granted Sporleder visitation rights. 2 However, the circuit court of ap-
peals reversed, holding that Sporleder did not have the legal status of parent,
that she lacked standing to exercise parental rights, and that the agreement
was void as against public policy. 3 Moreover, the court decided that Hermes
was not equitably estopped from denying Sporleder's parental status.54
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed the court of appeals's judg-
ment.55 First, the court explained that a nonparent could not sue to obtain
custody of a minor child absent unfitness of the natural or adoptive parent or
the existence of compelling circumstances to award custody to a third party. 6
43. 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
44. Inre Interest ofZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d202, 206 (Wis. 1991), overruledbyln re Custody
of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,434 (Wis. 1995); see infra notes 67-81 and accompanying text
(discussing In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.).
45. ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 212-13.









55. Id. at 213.
56. See id at 204-09 (discussing standards for obtaining standing in visitation and
custody cases).
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The court then held that Sporleder was not entitled to visitation under the
applicable statute, which permitted petitions for visitation "by a grandparent,
greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has maintained a relationship
similar to a parent-child relationship with the child," '57 when a court finds that
visitation is in the child's best interest." Based on its prior case law, the court
concluded that the statute is implicated only when an underlying legal action
exists that affects the family unit.59 With respect to the coparenting agreement
between the parties, the court stated that, to the extent the agreement pur-
ported to give Sporleder custody or visitation rights, it "is inconsistent with
legislative intent behind the custody and visitation statutes, which prefer
parents over third parties. It is also inconsistent with our conclusion that,
unless circumstances compel a contrary conclusion, it is in [the child's] best
interest to live in his legal parent's home."6" The court explained:
[B]ecause of the public interest in maintaining a stable relationship be-
tween a child and his or her legal parent, the co-parenting agreement, to the
extent that it purports to award custody or grant visitation rights .... is
unenforceable. While we recognize that Sporleder may have had a reason-
able expectation that she would have continued contact with [the child]
underthe agreement, enforcing the agreement would be contrary to legisla-
tive intent and the public interest.61
Finally, the court observed that Hermes was not equitably estopped from
denying that Sporleder was the child's parent, pointing out that "[t]he legal
effects and consequences of statutory limitations cannot be avoided by
estoppel."62 The Wisconsin court simply was not ready to recognize visitation
rights for lesbian coparents.
2. Judicial Acknowledgment of "Coparent" Visitation Rights
Less than a year after the Wisconsin court's decision in ZJ..H, a New
Mexico appeals court refused to find that an oral coparenting agreement
between the mother of an artificially conceived child and the mother's female
companion was unenforceable as a matter of law.63 InA. C. v. C.B.,4 the New
57. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
58. See In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 210-11 (Wis. 1991) (explaining
legislative intent and pertinent case law), overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d
419, 434 (Wis. 1995).
59. Id at 209.
60. Id. at211.
61. Id. at 212.
62. Id.
63. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 663-65 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
64. 829 P.2d 660 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
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Mexico trial court had granted C.B.'s motion to dismiss, concluding that
visitation was not in the child's best interest."' The court of appeals, citing
and implicitly rejecting ZJ.H.'s holding that a coparenting agreement was
void as against public policy, remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on
whether visitation would be in the best interests of the child.'
In 1995, the Wisconsin court reconsidered its position on visitation rights
for lesbian partners of legal parents. Inln re Custody ofH.S.H.-K,67 the Wis-
consin Supreme Court radically departed from its prior decision in ZJ.H68
Justice Shirley S. Abrahamson, who had dissented in ZJH., delivered the
court's opinion."9 InH.S.H.-K., Sandra Holtzman sought custody of, or visita-
tionrightsto, the biological child ofher lesbian formerpartner, Elsbeth Knott."
Consistent with its earlier decision, the court held that the Wisconsin statute
that governed visitation did not apply to Holtzman's petition for visitation
with Knott's child because the legislature only intended the statute to apply to
cases involving the dissolution of marriage.7' Nevertheless, the court reached
the startling conclusion that the legislature did not intend that the visitation
statute "be the exclusive provision on visitation," nor that it "supplant or pre-
empt the courts' long recognized equitable power to protect the best interest
of a child by ordering visitation in circumstances not included in the statute."72
Asserting that it was "[m]indful of preserving a biological or adoptive
parent's constitutionally protected interests and the best interest of a child,"
the court determined that, in order for a hearing court to decide whether
visitation is in the child's best interest, a petitioner must prove that she has a
"parent-like relationship" with the subject child and that "a significanttrigger-
ing event justifies state intervention in the child's relationship with a biologi-
cal or adoptive parent."73 In order to show that a parent-like relationship
exists, the court stated that the party asserting that such a relationship exists
must satisfy four requirements. First, the party must prove consent and
fostering of the relationship by the biological or adoptive parent.7' Second,
65. A.C. v. C.B., 829 P.2d 660, 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
66. Id at 664 (citing In re Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202, 211 (Wis. 1991)).
67. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
68. In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 420 (Wis. 1995).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See id at 424 (explaining that custody provisions of Wisconsin statute were not
applicable to situations that involve nonmarital relationships) (citing WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245
(West 1993 & Supp. 1997)).
72. Id at 424-25 (emphasis added).
73. Id at 435.
74. Id
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the party and the child must have lived in the same household.75 Third, the
party must have assumed parental obligations by undertaking-without expec-
tation of payment - significant responsibility for the child's care, education,
and development, including contribution toward the child's support.76 Finally,
the claiming party must have maintained a parental role for a time sufficient
to establish "a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature."'  Only
when these four conditions are met will the court consider awarding visitation
rights.
78
With respectto the "significant triggering event" thatwilljustify coercive
state intervention in the relationship between the child and the natural or
adoptive parent, the court stated that the party seeking visitation must prove
the parent's substantial interference with the parent-child like relationship and
that the party sought court-ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the
interference. 79 If the party seeking visitation can prove these elements of a
parent-child like relationship and a significant triggering event followed by a
prompt petition for visitation, the Wisconsin Supreme Court decided that the
trial court must determine whether visitation is in the child's best interests."
The court remanded the case to the trial court to hold a hearing concerning
H.S.H.-K.'s best interests.8'
The New Mexico court's decision in A.C. v. C.B. and the Wisconsin
court's decision in HS.H-K signal an increasing willingness to recognize
visitation claims by lesbian former coparents. Hovever, such recognition is
not universal. In West v. Superior Court,2 the California Court of Appeal
recently denied visitation rights to a lesbian former coparent.83
B. Stepparents
Proceedings implicating the visitation rights of stepparents arise in a
context significantly different from those in which the parties describe them-
75. Id.
76. Id. at 435-36.
77. Id. at 436.
78. Id. at 435.
79. Id. at 436.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 437; see also J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1321-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996)
(finding lesbian former partners lived together in nontraditional family with child and conclud-
ing relationship entitled plaintiff to seek parental custody rights).
82. 69 Cal. Rptr. 160 (Ct. App. 1997).
83. West v. Superior Ct., 69 Cal. Rptr. 160, 164 (Ct. App. 1997) (refusing to recognize
standing of lesbian former coparent) (citing Curiale v. Regan, 272 Cal. Rptr. 520, 521-22
(1990)).
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selves as lesbian coparents. In some cases, stepparents seek visitation when
marriage to a custodial parent ends in divorce. The issue also frequently
arises upon the death of the custodial parent.'
AS divorce rates rose during the 1970s and 1980s and many families
confronted issues involving child custody and visitation, legislatures began
recognizing visitation-rights for third parties. Legislatures in every state have
recognized such rights for grandparents."5 In addition, approximately one-
third of states have statutes that provide, either expressly or in language
authorizing nonparent visitation that is sufficiently broad to include some
stepparents, for visitation by stepparents. 6
Even a cursory review of statutes that explicitly provide for stepparent
visitation reveals little uniformity and a surprising lack of clarity. Currently,
statutes in eight states explicitly address visitation by stepparents.8 7 Most of
these statutes, with varying degrees of complexity, provide for both stepparent
and grandparent visitation rights." For example, the Kansas statute simply
states that "[g]randparents and stepparents may be granted visitation rights."89
More broadly, Oregon's statute affords standing to petition or intervene in
custody or visitation proceedings to anyone "who has established emotional
ties creating a child-parent relationship with a child" and expressly includes,
among others, stepparents and grandparents."° Uniquely, the Louisiana statute
gives identical visitation rights to stepparents and stepgrandparents. 9'
In addition to the general requirement, whether express or implicit, that
visitation be in the best interest of the child, a number of statutes contain
additional conditions that must be satisfied before the court will entertain a
petition for visitation by a third party.' For example, Virginia's statute
84. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 129 (1994) (discussing
stepparent visitation right disputes).
85. See ia at 130 (citing Elaine D. Ingulli, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Social
Policies and Legal Rights, 87 W. VA. L. REV. 295 (1985)).
86. Id
87. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101 (West 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616 (1994 & Supp.
1996); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West Supp. 1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17
(1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119 (1995); TENN. CODEANN. § 36-6-303 (1996); VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
88. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1616(b) (1994 & Supp. 1996); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 450.17(v) (1995); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1995); VA. CODEANN. § 16.1-241 (Michie
1996); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
89. KAN.STAT. ANN. §60-1616(b)(1994&Supp. 1996).
90. OR.REv. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1995).
91. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (West Supp. 1997).
92. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 3101(a) (West 1994) (describing best interest of child as
always critical). The California statute provides: "Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
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requires that a petitioner for visitation have a "legitimate interest."'  The
statute further requires broad construction to include (within the category of
persons with legitimate interests) stepparents, former stepparents, grandpar-
ents, and other family members and blood relatives.94 In addition, the court
must accommodate the child's best interests.9" Tennessee requires that visita-
tion be in the child's best interests and thatthe stepparent provide or contrib-
ute to the child's support before the stepparent may be granted visitation
rights.
96
Under Louisiana's statute, a noncustodial parent will receive reasonable
visitation rights unless the court finds that visitation is not in the child's best
interest.97 Other petitioners who seek visitation, including stepparents, must
prove that "extraordinary circumstances" exist.9 8 The statute does not define
extraordinary circumstances, nor does the case law indicate when such cir-
cumstances might exist.99 Finally, in Wisconsin, biological or adoptive
parents must receive notice of the hearing before a court can award steppar-
ents and other third parties visitation rights."°
the court may grant reasonable visitation to a stepparent, if visitation by the stepparent is
determined to be in the best interest of the minor child." Id. Louisiana's statute sets out a more
elaborate definition of best interests. It provides:
Under extraordinary circumstances, a relative, by blood or affinity, or a former
stepparent or stepgrandparent, not granted custody of the child may be granted
reasonable visitation rights if the court finds that it is in the best interest of the
child. In determining the best interest of the child, the court shall consider:
(1) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the
relative.
(2) Whether the child is in need of guidance, enlightenment, or tutelage which
can best be provided by the relative.
(3) The preference of the child if he is determined to be of sufficient maturity
to express a preference.
(4) The willingness of the relative to encourage a close relationship between the
child and his parent or parents.
(5) The mental and physical health of the child and the relative.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(B) (West Supp. 1997).
93. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(6) (Michie 1996).
94. Id.
95. Id. § 16.1-278.15(B).
96. TENN. CODEANN. § 36-6-303(a) (1996).
97. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 136(A).
98. Id. art. 136(B).
99. See Henry v. Henry, 665 So. 2d 87, 88 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (stating that stepgrand-
mother must establish existence of extraordinary circumstances for a court to grant visitation
rights).
100. Wis. STAT. ANN. §767.245(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
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In addition to those states in which the legislature has explicitly ad-
dressed the issue of stepparent visitation, statutes in nine states are broad
enough to permit recognition of a stepparent's standing to seek visitation.' °'
Alaska's statute permits the court in connection with certain designated
proceedings to order visitation by a child's grandparent "or other person if that
is in the best'interests of the child."' 2 Courts hearing matrimonial actions in
Connecticut may grant visitation "to a third party, including but not limited to
grandparents."10 3 In addition, the Arizona statute that governs maternity and
paternity proceedings permits "any party" to request visitation.'
A relative paucity of reported cases addresses the right of stepparents to
visitation. Apparently, the earliest case was decided in 1977.5 Although
petitions for visitation rights by stepparents, like those of so-called lesbian
coparents, have received a somewhat mixed reception, courts more often than
not have found several bases on which to grant visitation. Courts have
awarded these visitation rights even in the face of legislative silence with
respect to the specific question and despite criticism that granting visitation
"opens the door to the butcher, the baker and the candlestick maker to a right
to a hearing on 'visitation' rights."'
' °6
In Spells v. Spells, 7 apparently the first appellate court decision to
address the question of stepparent visitation rights, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania found the paramount interest in visitation disputes to be the best
interest of the child. 8 The court stated:
It is our belief that a stepfather may not be denied the right to visit his
stepchildren merely because of his lack of a blood relationship to them.
Clearly, a stepfather and his young stepchildren who live in a family envir-
101. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1996); ARIZ.REV. STAT.ANN. § 25-803(B) (West
Supp. 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-56(a) (West 1995); HAW. REv. STAT. § 571-46(7)
(Supp. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (2b) (West 1992); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.375
(West 1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.1 (1995); OmO REv. CoDE ANN. § 3109.051(B)(1)
(Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240 (West 1997).
102. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (Michie 1996).
103. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-56 (West 1995).
104. ARIz.REV. STAT.ANN. § 25-803(B) (West Supp. 1997). Itshould be noted, however,
that the Arizona Court of Appeals has placed limitations on the statutory language by denying
visitation to a party who failed to establish paternity. Hughes v. Creighton, 798 P.2d 403,405-
06 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990). That court has also limited visitation rights to noncustodial parents,
grandparents, great-grandparents, and stepparents, despite the plaintiff's in loco parentis rela-
tionship with the child. Id.
105. Spells v. Spells, 378 A.2d 879, 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
106. Simpson v. Simpson, 586 S.W.2d 33, 36 (Ky. 1979) (Stephenson, J., dissenting).
107. 378 A.2d 879 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
108. Spells v. Spells, 378 A. 2d 879, 881 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
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onment may develop deep and lasting mutual bonds of affection. Courts
must acknowledge the fact that a stepfather (or stepmother) may be the
only parent that the child has truly known and loved during its minority.
A stepparent may be as devoted and concerned about the welfare of a step-
child as a natural parentwould be. Rejection ofvisitation privileges cannot
be grounded in the mere status as a stepparent.1 9
The court used this reasoning to remand the case to the trial court for a
determination of whether granting visitation rights to the children's stepfather
would be in the children's best interest. °
Most commonly, courts granting stepparent visitation have relied on the
in loco parentis doctrine, coupled with the requirement that visitation be in the
best interests of the child."' Courts in some states, however, have decided the
question of stepparent visitation solely on the basis of what serves the best
interest of the child, without requiring a showing that the child and stepparent
were in loco parentis."' In Shoemaker v. Shoemaker,"' the Alabama Court
of Civil Appeals held that a former stepparent had no formal right, either at
common law or by statute, to visitation with a former stepchild. 4 However,
the court stated that, because there was no legislative prohibition against
109. Id.
110. Id. at 883-84.
111. See Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982) (remanding case for
determination of whether stepfather stood in loco parentis to child and whether grant of
visitation to stepfather would be in child's best interest); In re Marriage of Dureno, 854 P.2d
1352, 1357 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (listing factors to consider in determining stepparent
visitation rights include best interests of child and whether stepparent has acted in custodial and
parental relationship); Hughes v. Banning, 541 N.E.2d 283,284 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (explain-
ing that to establish visitation rights, third person must show custodial and parental relationship
exists and that visitation would be in child's best interests); Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d
788, 790-92 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that in loco parentis relationship between steppar-
ent and child may entitle stepparent to visitation while still recognizing precedence of child's
best interests); Klipstein v. Zalewski, 553 A.2d 1384, 1386 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1988)
(stating that ultimate goal of court is to promote child's best interests and stating that many
courts have held that when stepparent assumes in loco parentis relationship with child, there
are circumstances when court will impose support obligations on parent); Wilson v. Wilson,
594 A.2d 717, 719 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (considering whether two years spent with child is
enough time to establish in loco parentis status and recognizing importance of child's best
interests).
112. See Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1981) (stating that if
visitation with nonparent would promote welfare of child trial judge should have broad
discretion to allow such visitation); Honaker v. Burnside, 388 S.E.2d 322, 324 (W. Va. 1989)
(explaining determination of best interests of child is significant to decision involving child
custody).
113. 563 So. 2d 1032 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
114. Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 563 So. 2d 1032, 1034 (Ala. Civ. App. 1990).
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granting a former stepparent visitation rights, a court could grant visitation
when visitation would be in the best interests of the child."' Significantly, the
court placed limits on when visitation is in the best interests of the child,
stating that
[i]t may be questioned whether the best interests of a child would be served
if the exercise of visitation by a former stepparent was against the wishes
of the natural parent.... To force a former stepparent's (legally a mere
non-parent) visitation upon a natural parent or the former stepchild, over
either's objection, would appear to be a detriment to the best interests of
the child."6
The Shoemaker court concluded that the stepparent could not gain visitation
rights because he could not show that such rights would advance the best
interests of the child.'
17
Florida and Maryland court decisions echo the Shoemaker court's eleva-
tion of the best interests of the child standard. In Wills v. Wills,"' the District
Court of Appeal of Florida found that when the record shows that visitation
is in the child's best interest, the trial judge's discretion is sufficiently
broad to allow an order of visitation with a nonparent.11' The court carefully
limited its reasoning, stressing that "this type of visitation, contrary to the
wishes of the custodial parent, should be awarded with great circumspec-
tion."12 In Evans v. Evans,"' Maryland's highest court concluded that
Maryland trial courts could award visitation rights to stepparents.' " However,
the Maryland court did not include the limiting language that appears in
Wills."2 In Evans, the Maryland court stated: "While an in loco parentis
status may affect the court's determination as to the best interests of the child,






118. 399 So. 2d 1130 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
119. Wills v. Wills, 399 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
120. Id.
121. 488 A.2d 157 (Md. 1985).
122. Evans v. Evans, 488 A.2d 157, 162 (Md. 1985).
123. See Wills, 399 So. 2d at 1131 (stating that courts should exercise caution when
granting visitation rights against custodial parent's wishes).
124. Evans, 488 A.2d at 162; see also Rhinehartv. Nowlin, 805 P.2d 88,92-93 (N.M. Ct.
App. 1990) (concluding that trial courts have power and discretion to grant visitation rights to
stepmother when such visitation is in best interests of children).
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In Cox v. Williams," the Supreme Court of Wisconsin took a less
expansive approach to the question of whether there was a legal basis for
visitation by a former stepparent over the objection of a child's mother.26
The court stated that the stepparent, who sought court-ordered visitation with
the child of her deceased husband and his first wife, lacked standing." 7
Relying on prior Wisconsin decisions,128 the court explained that, in order for
a party to have standing to seek nonparent visitation, there must exist an
underlying action affecting the family unit and the child's family must not be
intact. "'29 Neither condition was satisfied in Cox.
30
The Cox court divided sharply. One dissenter described the result as
"inappropriately grotesque and contrary to an unmistakable mandate of the
legislature.'3' Another dissenter called the result harsh, unnecessary, and
absurd. 132
The cases discussed above demonstrate that Professor Katharine Bart-
lett's observations with respect to judicial treatment of stepparent visitation
are as true today as when she made them in 1984.113 Professor Bartlett stated:
The few courts that have awarded stepparent visitation or stepparent
custody have had to strain both common and statutory law to reach such
results. In visitation cases, courts sometimes have disregarded the absence
of a statute granting visitation rights to nonparents and have assumed
jurisdiction to allow such visitation simply because the stepparent had
125. 502 N.W.2d 128 (Wis. 1993).
126. Cox v. Williams, 502 N.W.2d 128, 128-29 (Wis. 1993).
127. Id.
128. See In re InterestofZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d 202,210-11 (Wis. 1991) (statingno authority
existed for nonparent to petition for visitation rights when no intact family unit existed or in
absence of underlying action affecting family unit); Van Cleve v. Hemminger, 415 N.W.2d 571,
573-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 1987) (limiting statutory visitation right to cases in which underlying
action affecting family unit previously has been filed).
129. Cox, 502 N.W.2d at 130 (citing Wis. STAT. AN. § 767.245 (West 1993 & Supp.
1997)). The statute provides, in pertinent part:
[U]pon petition by a grandparent, great grandparent, stepparent or person who has
maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship with the child, the
court may grant reasonable visitation rights to that person if the parents have notice
of the hearing and if the court determines that visitation is in the best interest of the
child.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767.245(1).
130. Cox, 502N.W.2d at 130.
131. Id. at 131 (Heffernan, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. (Bablitch, J., dissenting).
133. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need
for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv.
879, 912-19 (1984).
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physical custody of the child at the date of the petition for custody or vis-
itation. Other courts have invoked the in locoparentis doctrine, ignoring
the common law rule that such status ends with the dissolution of the
stepparent's marriage."'
Noting that "[s]ome cases reach emotionally appealing results without legal
analysis,""' Professor Bartlett described the "similar analytic difficulties"
faced by courts in those jurisdictions in which statutes limit custody awards
to natural parents.'36 In some such instances, she noted, "[w]hile making
passing reference to a natural parent presumption, [the courts] have approved
what was essentially a best interests analysis tojustify an award of custody to
a stepparent."' 37
C. Foster Parents
In light of the significant number of children in long term foster care, it
is surprising to see how infrequently one encounters judicial decisions or
commentary relating to visitation claims by former foster parents.3 s Requests
for visitation by foster parents necessarily arise in a context that distinguishes
them from petitions by lesbian coparents or by former stepparents. The latter
two groups of claimants argue, in effect, that they and the child were members
of a family that has been disrupted. Foster parents, whose relationships with
children originate in a contract with the state to provide child care, cannot
make this claim.
Only Oregon explicitly authorizes petitions for visitation by foster
parents. 3 9 Oregon's statute affords standing to "[a]ny person including but
not limited to a related or nonrelated foster parent, stepparent, grandparent or
relative by blood or marriage who has established emotional ties creating a
child-parent relationship with a child."' 40 The statute generally defines a
parent-child relationship as one in existence within a six-month period prior
to the filing of an action, but requires a period in excess of eighteen months




136. I d at 916.
137. Id.
138. See ROBERT H. MNOOKIN & D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILD, FAMILY, AND STATE 460
(1995).
139. See OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1995) (providing authority to courts to award
visitation to stepparents).
140. Id
141. Id. § 109.119(4).
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In the absence of explicit legislative authority to grant visitation to step-
parents, the courts generally refuse to grant visitation rights. In an early case
concerning visitation rights for foster parents, a highly respected New York
Family Court judge, Nanette Dembitz, dealt squarely with a conflict between
a child's foster parents and her natural father and stepmother.14 In In re
MelissaM.,43 Judge Dembitz succinctly stated the issue as "whether the court
can and should grant the right of visitation to former foster-parents, who had
given their foster-child excellent care for virtually all of her first 4 1/2 years
of life, after her return to her natural father and step-mother."'" Judge
Dembitz said no. 45
When the court first returned the child to her father and stepmother, the
foster parents petitioned the court for visitation rights. 46 The court granted
the child's parents' request that the court delay consideration of the foster
parents' motion for visitation to afford them time to promote the child's adjust-
ment to them as her custodial parents. 147 Nine months later, the foster parents
renewed their motion.148 Although conceding the foster parents' love for the
child, the parents opposed visitation, asserting that it would cause the child
confusion and instability and would disrupt their family life. 49 The court
found the parents' view to be reasonable and viewed the issue as "whether the
court can substitute its judgment of Melissa's best interests for theirs." '
Although recognizing the poignancy of the foster parents' heartbreak at their
separation from the child and its "seeming unfairness," Judge Dembitz stated:
While the State can modify and even abrogate the parent's right to raise his
childunder exigent circumstances, neverthelesstheparental decisionmaking
prerogative with "freedom ofpersonal choice in matters of ... family life"
should be maintained or restored unless there is strong reason for inter-
ference with it. Here state intervention would be unjustified because the
parents have shown themselves entirely adequate to judge Melissa's needs
as an individual and as a family member.'
Thus, Judge Dembitz denied the foster parents' request for visitation rights.'
142. In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (am. Ct. 1979).
143. 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (Eam. Ct. 1979).
144. In re Melissa M., 421 N.Y.S.2d 300, 301 (Earn. Ct. 1979).
145. Id. at 304.
146. Id. at 301.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 304.
150. Id.
151. Id (citations omitted).
152. Id.
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The New York courts continue to reject foster parent requests for visita-
tion rights. In Bessette v. Saratoga County Commissioner of Social Serv-
ices,'53 an intermediate appellate court held that, absent a statute granting
standing, former foster parents have no right to seek visitation limiting the
rights of a fit parent. 4 Citing Alison D. v. Virginia M, the Bessette court
explained that because the former foster parents did not have standing under
the applicable statute, they enjoyed "no right to seek visitation which would
limit or diminish the right of the biological parent, who has not been found to
be unfit, to choose with whom her children associate."
55
Falling between the extremes ofgrantlng and denying visitation rights to
foster parents, some courts have permitted visitation by foster parents for a
limited period of time in order to ease the transition from foster parents to
natural parents. In In re Simolke,5 6 for example, the Louisiana Court of
Appeal affirmed the trial court's order transferring care of a child to his
natural parents.1 57 The trial court had permitted monthly visitation by the
foster parents in order to "prevent an abrupt transition with the intent to
reduce possible traumatic effect on the child."5 8 Noting that the best interests
of the child is "the sole criterion" in child custody cases, the court of appeal
found no abuse of discretion in awarding custody to the natural parents and
in simultaneously awarding visitation rights to the foster parents.
159
D. Grandparents
Although the common law treated grandparents as legal strangers, today
grandparents generally enjoy a statutory right to visitation. 6 ° One authorita-
tive commentator has observed that, "[s]ince these statutes are the product of
a combination of the lobbying efforts of grandparent groups and the sentimen-
tality of the state legislatures, they take so many different forms and limit
visitation to so many different kinds of circumstances that it is extremely
153. 619 N.Y.S.2d 359 (App. Div. 1994).
154. Bessette v. Saratoga County Comm'r of Soc. Servs., 619 N.Y.S.2d 359, 360 (App.
Div. 1994).
155. Id. at 360 (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29-30 (N.Y. 1991)).
156. 422 So. 2d 196 (La. Ct App. 1982).
157. In re Simolke, 422 So. 2d 196, 198 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
158. Id at 197-98.
159. Id. at 198; cf In re Kristina L., 520 A.2d 574, 582 (R.I. 1987) (stating that foster
family should continue to be part of child's life and that provisions must be made to ease
transition for everyone concerned).
160. See Catherine A. McCrimmon & Robert J. Howell, Grandparents' Legal Rights to
Visitation in the Fifty States and the District of Columbia, 17 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 355, 355-56 (1989) (noting that "access to grandparents, regardless of other legal situa-
tions, is now considered the child's legal right").
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difficult to classify them."'6' However, most of the statutes encompass an
approach based on the best interests of the child standard.
6
1
The statutes vary with respect to the circumstances under which a grand-
parent may petition for, or be entitled to, the right of visitation. Some are
couched in language that is broad enough to allow a court to grant visitation
by a grandparent whenever it is in the best interests of the child. 63 Others
require the grandparent and the child to have established a substantial relation-
ship before visitation rights may be granted."6 New York allows grandparents
to petition for visitation "where circumstances show that conditions exist
which equity would see fit to intervene.' ' 6' However, some states bar courts
from granting visitation rights when doing so would interfere with the parent-
child relationship.
6
Although all states have general provisions that provide for some form
of grandparent visitation, many statutes also list a wide variety of specific
circumstances that permit a grandparent to petition for visitation rights.
Frequently, one finds statutory provisions that permit grandparents to petition
for visitation when the child's parents are either divorced or are in the process
of dissolving their marriage, 167 or when either one or both of the child's
parents has died. 68 In a few states, specific statutory provisions permit a
grandparent to petition for visitation rights when courts have terminated the
parental rights of one or both parents.
169
161. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES,
§ 19.7, at 828 (2d ed. 1988).
162. See infra notes 281-319 and accompanying text (discussing application and criticism
of best interest of child standard in grandparent visitation cases).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46-59 (West 1995); HAw.REv. STAT. § 571-46(7) (Supp.
1996); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-7-420(33) (Law Co-op.
Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.240(5) (West 1997).
164. IOWACODEANN. § 598.35 (West 1996 & Supp. 1997); KAN. STAT.ANN. § 38-129(a)
(1993); Miss. CoDEANN. § 93-16-3(2)(a) (1994).
165. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (McKinney Supp. 1997-98).
166. MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West 1992); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-1802(2) (1993); 23
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5311 (West 1991).
167. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (Supp.
1997); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46(7) (Supp. 1996); IOWA CODEANN. § 598.35 (West 1996 &
Supp. 1997); MASS. GEN. LAWSANN. ch. 119, § 39D (West 1993); MO.ANN. STAT. § 452.4021(1)
(West 1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-1802(1)(b) (1993).
168. ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150(a) (Michie 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-
117(1)(c) (West 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(I)(a) (West 1997); 750 ILL. COM. STAT.
ANN. 5/607 (b)(1)(C) (West Supp. 1997); 755 ILL. COM'. STAT.ANN. 5/11-7.1 (West 1992);
MICH. COWE. LAWS ANN. § 722.27b (West Supp. 1997); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022 (West
1992); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3109.11 (Banks-Baldwin Supp. 1997); 23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 5311 (West 1991); TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 153.433(2)(A) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
169. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3(b) (Supp. 1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-16-3(1) (1994);
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Other statutory provisions provide for a cause of action for grandparents
when visitation has been denied unreasonably for a specified period of time 70
or when the grandparent and the child have resided together for a statutorily
defined time period."' A few legislatures have placed an arguably insubstan-
tial limitation on the visitation rights of grandparents by enacting provisions
requiring the termination of those rights upon the adoption of the child by
anyone other than a stepparent or a grandparent. 172
Simply stated, legislatures in every state have afforded statutory rights
to grandparents seeking visitation. The enactments and the scope of the rights
granted are of an enormous variety and virtually defy rational classification. 73
No other group of legal strangers to children has been as favorably treated
with respect to visitation. For the most part, courts have applied the existing
statutory mandates and guidelines without question. 74 Recently, however, an
increasing number of courts and commentators have questioned both the
wisdom and the constitutionality of what has been wrought pursuant to
grandparent visitation statutes.'75
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.330, 125A.340 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 5(A)(4) (West
Supp. 1998); TEX. FAM. CODEANN. § 153.433(2)(E) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
170. MISS. CODEANN. § 93-16-3(2) (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.4021(3) (West 1997).
171. MNN. STAT. ANN. § 257.022(2a) (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-9-2 (Michie
1994); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5313(a) (West Supp. 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.433(2)(F) (West 1996 & Supp. 1998).
172. CAL. FAM. CODE § 3102(c) (West Supp. 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01(3) (West
1997); MONT. CODEANN. § 40-9-102(5) (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.50) (1995); S.D.
CODn~iaD LAWs § 25-4-54 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODEANN. § 36-6-302(d) (Supp. 1997); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1016 (1989).
173. But see Frame v. Nehls, 550 N.W.2d 739, 74748 (Mich. 1996) (upholding statute
that only allowed grandparent visitation in specifically described situations). InFramev. Nehls,
the Supreme Court of Michigan rejected an equal protection-based attack on a statute that limits
standing of grandparents seeking visitation to cases in which either a child custody dispute is
pending or the parent of their grandchild is deceased, thus barring visitation petitions by
grandparents whose child is alive or not involved in a custody dispute. Id. Noting the absence
of a fundamental right or suspect class, the court found a rational basis for the classifications,
and provided the following reasons, among others:
The Legislature might have determined that unlimited resort to judicially enforced
grandparent visitation might infringe on a parent's fundamental right to raise a child
without interference from the government, that unlimited jurisdiction over grandparent
visitation might invite legal disputes over issues that are more appropriately resolved
outside the legal forum, or that because visitation disputes by definition involve
interfamily conflict, expansive jurisdiction would not serve the minor's best interests.
Id at 747.
174. See Sightes v. Barker, 684 N.E.2d 224,232 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) (upholding grand-
parent visitation statute because "it is rationally related to furthering the legitimate state interest
in fostering relationships between grandparents and their grandchildren").
175. See infra notes 320-64 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of grandparent
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III Scholarly Commentary on Third Party Visitation
Despite the mixed reception that their claims have received in the courts,
legal strangers who assert a right to visitation with other people's children
have not lacked for champions and defenders in the law reviews. In numerous
articles, any number of which come uncomfortably close to what Professor
Mary Ann Glendon characterizes as advocacy scholarship, 6 legal writers
have proposed changing the common understanding and definitions of parent
and family. For example, one commentator has proposed the following
radical and far reaching definition:
A family is a living system, an entity, whose members are its interacting
parts .... A family ... includes individuals who share or seek to share
intimate relationships with each other. This definition includes biological
parents, even if the parents have had little or no contact with their child, so
long as they seek to form an intimate relationship with the child. It also
encompasses foster parents and stepparents, as well as certain neighbors or
friends, so long as they truly have a relationship of intimacy with a child.'"
Such proposals, if accepted by legislatures and courts, would significantly
enhance the rights of those who seek third party visitation with other people's
children.
Professor Nancy D. Polikoff was among the first advocates of enhanced
legal status for persons whose intimate relationships with children are
often denied legal recognition. 7 ' She "proposes expanding the definition of
visitation statutes). But see Karen Czapanskiy, Grandparents, Parents, and Grandchildren:
Actualizing Interdependency in Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 1315, 1374-75 (1995) (supporting
adoption of new legal standard granting legal rights over children based on degree of care
exercised by adult).
176. See MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRIsIs IN THE
LEGAL PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SocIETY 208 (1994). Professor Glendon
observes:
[A]dvocacy scholarship, as that term is understood among law professors, openly
or covertly abandons the traditional obligation to deal with significant contrary
evidence or arguments .... Ironically, it was a paragon of romantic judging who
was one of the first people to call attention to the sudden increase of partisan legal
literature in the 1960s. Many writers of law review articles, Justice William 0.
Douglas complained, were failing to disclose that they were "people with axes to
grind."
Id. (quoting William 0. Douglas, Law Reviews and FullDisclosure, 40 WASH. L. REV. 227,229
(1965)).
177. Susan L. Brooks, A Family Systems Paradigm for Legal Decision Making Affecting
Child Custody, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (1996).
178.. See Polikoff, supra note 4, at 463 (arguing that then-current legal literature ill-
prepared courts to address problems caused by dissolution of lesbian coparent relationships).
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parenthood to include anyone who maintains a functional parental relationship
with a child when a legally recognized parent created that relationship with
the intent that the relationship be parental in nature."" 9 Although Polikoff's
concern appears to be primarily with lesbian-mother families, she notes that
issues regarding the legal definition of parenthood have also arisen in contexts
such as surrogacy, stepfamilies, and out-of-wedlock births.' She asserts:
A new definition of parenthood is necessary to adapt to the complexities
of modem families. Although biology coupled with a relationship and
legal adoption currently confer parenthood and should continue to do so,
such status should also derive from proof of a parent-child relationship
that has developed through the cooperation and consent of someone
already possessing the status of a legal parent."'8
In addition, Polikoff questions the sufficiency of biology and legal adoption
as bases for establishing the status of parent "in a complex world affected by
cultural norms, technology, and patterns of sexual behavior."' Pointing out
the commonness of variation from the one father and one mother model for
parenthood, she argues that "[c]ommunal child rearing, surrogacy, open
adoption, stepfamilies, and extramarital births all destroy the myth of family
homogeneity."'8
In her discussion of new theories for establishing parenthood, Polikoff
describes equitable parenthood, child-parent relationships, and nonexclusive
parenthood doctrines. "' In Atkinson v. Atkinson,'85 the Michigan Court of
Professor Polikoff is generally recognized as a leading authority on and an articulate advocate
for the legal recognition of those she describes as lesbian-mother families. Her other works in
this and related areas include: The Deliberate Construction of Families Without Fathers: Is
It an Option For Lesbian and Heterosexual Mothers?, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 375 (1996);
The Social Construction ofParenthood in One PlannedLesbian Family, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 203 (1996); Thomas S. v. Robin Y.: BriefAmicus Curiae ofthe National Center
for Lesbian Rights; Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund; Gay andLesbian Advocates
andDefenders; Center Kids; and Gay andLesbian Parents Coalition International in Support
ofRespondent-Appellee, 22N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 213 (1996); and W1hyAre Mothers
Losing: A BriefAnalysis ofCriteria Used in Child Custody Determinations, 14 WOMEN's RTs.
L. REP. 175 (1992).
179. Polikoff, supra note 4, at 464; see Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The
Constitutional Right of Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53
MD. L. REV. 358, 410-11 (1994) (arguing courts should grant visitation rights to individuals
who maintain parent-like relationships with other people's children).
180. Polikoff, supra note 4, at 471.
181. Id (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 474.
183. Id.
184. Id at483-91.
185. 408 N.W.2d 516 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
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Appeals created the equitable parent doctrine."6 In Atkinson, the mother of
a four-year-old child claimed that her divorced husband was not entitled to
custody or visitation because he was not the child's father." 7 Although a
court-ordered blood test excluded the former husband as the biological father,
the Michigan appellate court heeded the husband's novel request that it adopt
the equitable parent doctrine.' The court stated:
[W]e adopt the doctrine of "equitable parent" and find that a husband who
is not the biological father of a child born or conceived during the marriage
may be considered the natural father of that child where (1) the husband
and the child mutually acknowledge a relationship as father and child, or
the mother ofthe child has cooperated in the development of such a relation-
ship over a period of time prior to the filing of the complaint for divorce,
(2) the husband desires to have the rights afforded to a parent, and (3) the
husband is willing to take on the responsibility ofpaying child support.1
8 9
Polikoff presumes that the latter two parts of this test, the nonbiological
mother's desire for parenthood rights and willingness to pay child support,
would apply in a lesbian-mother family."9 She also asserts that the first
requirement, that the husband and child mutually acknowledge the parent-
child relationship or that the biological mother cooperate in developing the
relationship, is easily adapted from a marital to a nonmarital situation. 9'
Accordingly, she concludes that "[i]f the nonbiological mother in a lesbian-
mother family satisfies the relationship prong of the Atkinson test, she is no
less a parent than was the husband in Atkinson.""9
Polikoff's second theory for establishing parenthood for legal strangers
is the child-parent relationship doctrine. In her discussion of this theory,
Polikoff cites the Oregon statute that gives standing in custody and visitation
186. Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519-20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987).
187. Id.at 517.
188. Id. at 519.
189. Id. The majority of courts that have considered equitable parenthood claims have
rejected them. See Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 217-19 (Ct. App. 1991)
(refusing to apply doctrine of equitable estoppel and noting that one California court declined
to adopt concept of equitable parenthood); In re Marriage of Goetz & Lewis, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30,
33 (Ct. App. 1988) (stating that legislature is better equipped to determine whether to adopt
equitable parent doctrine); In re Ash, 507 N.W.2d 400, 402-05 (Iowa 1993) (rejecting lower
court's reliance on equitable parent doctrine); In re O'Brien, 772 P.2d 278, 283-84 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (rejecting claim of adoption by estoppel or equitable parenthood); Zuziak v. Zuziak,
426 N.W.2d 761, 766 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to extend equitable parent doctrine). But
see In re Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 480-82 (Iowa 1995) (stating that "equitable parenthood
may be established in a proper case by father who establishes" several factors).




proceedings to anyone "who 'has established emotional ties creating a child-
parent relationship with a child.""93 The Oregon statute expressly includes
stepparents and grandparents, among others.'94 After a review of the legisla-
tive history and ajudicial interpretation of the statute, Polikoff concludes that,
if one reads the statute to require a best interests standard in disputes between
legally recognized parents and nonparents who have established a child-parent
relationship, "the interpretation could facilitate awards of custody to nonbio-
logical lesbian mothers.'1
95
Polikoff describes a third new theory, nonexclusive parenthood, as a
"hybrid of the equitable parenthood and child-parent relationship doctrines." 96
She credits Professor Katharine Bartlett for this approach, which proposes that
in custody disputes courts should afford status as parties to legal, biological,
and psychological parents.'97 She notes Bartlett's three requirements for
psychological parenthood: (1) that there be at least six months of physical
custody, (2) that the adult custodian is motivated by care and concern for a
child who conceives of the adult's parental role, and (3) that the relationship
with the child began with the consent of the child's legal parent or by court
order. 9
Polikoffobserves that "[it] is cause for optimism that courts, legislatures,
and scholars are struggling to devise new doctrines to address the needs of
children in families that do not fit the one-mother/one-father model."'199 She
states:
Courts or legislatures looking for guidance in developing a new definition
ofparenthood would best serve the interests of children by focusing on two
criteria: the legally unrelated adult's performance of parenting functions
and the child's view of that adult as a parent. Courts would also protect the
interests of legal parents in parental autonomy by focusing on the actions
and intent of those parents in creating additional parental relationships.2"
In addition to the development of new theories for the establishment of
parenthood, Polikoff describes the possible application of two existing doc-
trines in lesbian coparent disputes: equitable estoppel and the in loco parentis
doctrine.2' She examines state court cases that have applied these doctrines
193. Id. at 486 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 109.119(1) (1995)).
194. OR. REv. STAT. § 109.119(1).
195. Polikoff, supra note 4, at 488.
196. Id. at 489.
197. Id. (citing Bartlett, supra note 133, at 944-51).
198. Id. at 489-90 (citing Bartlett, supra note 133, at 946-47).
199. Id. at 490.
200. Id. at 490-91.
201. See id. at 502 (noting that in loco parentis doctrine "creates parental rights and
responsibilities in one who voluntarily provides support or takes over custodial duties"); see
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in the context of child support awards and in decisions preserving parent-child
relationships between children and their nonbiological fathers, primarily step-
fathers.2 2 She argues that the results from these cases demonstrate that both
doctrines protect the interests of nontraditional families, including the chil-
dren.0 3
Polikoff next discusses the nonparent or third party legal status that
lesbian mothers currently occupy in disputes concerning custody and visita-
tion.2" She reviews the "overwhelmingly confused" jurisdictional law relat-
ing to standing and the substantive standards that the courts have applied in
third party custody and visitation disputes." 5 With respect to third party
visitation, Polikoff concludes:
"Third parties" who have functioned as parents to a child, as opposed to
third parties who have not, should be able to obtain visitation under the
standard applicable to parents. Thus, even jurisdictions in which non-
parents can be awarded visitation have not gone far enough. In these
jurisdictions the grant of visitation is discretionary with the court or re-
quires the nonparent to prove that visitation is in the best interests of the
child. The purpose of distinguishing among categories of third-party
visitation claimants is to recognize the explicitly parental status that some
"third parties" occupy inthe lives of children. Once "thirdparties" achieve
such status, courts should seek to continue the parent-child relationship
regardless of what happens to the adult relationship. Denying visitation
should be predicated on the same grounds as it is between legally recog-
nized parents - only upon proof of detriment to the child.2'
However, recognition that third parties have occupied "parental status" in the
lives of some children in some cases does not compel acceptance ofPolikoff's
advice to courts deciding visitation cases - that they should treat a legal
stranger to the child identically to the child's natural parent.
While Polikofffocuses on the legal status of lesbian-mother families, her
concerns seem broader because she proposes an expanded definition of
parenthood "to include anyone who maintains a functional parental relation-
ship with a child when a legally recognized parent created that relationship
also supra note 12 (describing equitable parent doctrine).
202. Polikoff, supra note 4, at 491-508.
203. See id. at 502 (noting equitable parent doctrine "serves the best interest of the child,
who will have developed the additional parental relationship in reliance upon the actions of the
legally recognized parent"); id. at 507 (stating that under in loco parentis doctrine "the rights
and responsibilities of parenthood... are based on the reality of who intentionally fulfills the
parenting function").
204. Id. at 508-22.
205. Id. at 508, 511-22.
206. Id. at 521 (footnotes omitted).
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with the intent that the relationship be parental in nature."2 7 In contrast, Paula
Ettelbrick is concerned exclusively with lesbian families. She focuses on
situations involving "lesbian couples who choose to have children together,
separate at some later point, and struggle over what parenting rights the non-
legal mother will or will not have."" 8
Ettelbrick concedes at the outset that she writes as an advocate who was
involved in the cases central to her discussion and as "a long-time advocate
for the legal recognition of lesbian and gay families in general."2 9 In what
appears to be a radical departure from Polikoff's views, Ettelbrick explains
her basic theory:
The experiences of lesbians having children cannot be addressed by trying
to fit them into a family law system that is so resolutely heterosexual in its
structure and presumptions. The law must be developed according to the
perspectives and experiences of lesbians, in much the same way that some
advocate that it be developed to fit the experiences of women and people
of color. As part of the evolving "outsider jurisprudence," a lesbian family
law jurisprudence must continue to emerge. The experiences of lesbians
having children, and the method by which the law responds, must stand
apart from heterosexual experience °
In support of her theory, Ettelbrick asserts that the basic experiences of les-
bians as parents differ from the experiences ofheterosexual parents.211 Further,
in Ettelbrick's view, because lesbian couples cannot marry, legal rules that
presume that marriage is the determinative factor for legal recognition as a
parent inherently discriminate against lesbian families.212 She contends legal
rules that presumptively give greater weight to the parent and child biological
connection over all other parental claims "eliminate the possibility that the
relationship between a non-biological lesbian mother and the child she raises
with her partner will ever be recognized."2 3 Ettelbrick concludes that "the
unique experiences of lesbians must be taken into account in developing the
law. Just as laws based on male experience do not work for women, laws
which draw only from heterosexual experience do not work for lesbians."
214
207. Id at 464. The rash of proposals in the law review literature during the 1990s were
significantly influenced by the arguments set out by Professor Bartlett. See Bartlett, supra note
133, at 882 (challenging exclusive notions of legal parenthood when nuclear families fail).
208. Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?: The Need to Develop a Lesbian Conscious
Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. L HUM. RTS. 513, 514 (1993).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 514-15 (footnotes omitted).
211. Id. at515.
212. Id at 515-16.
213. Idaat516.
214. Id
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With respect to the treatment of lesbian coparents seeking visitation with
the children of their former partners, Ettelbrick concludes that many courts
have ignored their own precedents solely because of "an underlying, though
unstated, antipathy towards lesbians and the'immorality' of lesbian parenting,
which follows neither the tradition of marriage nor biology."2 5 She cites
AlisonD. v. VirginiaM andln relnterestofZ.J.H in supportofherassertion."
Ettelbrick notes that she was the lawyer for Alison D. and that many of
the facts in her discussion of the case are based on her personal knowledge.217
She explains that the New York Court of Appeals was faced with the question
whether Alison D. was a "parent" and, therefore, had standing under the
statute to sue for visitation with Virginia M.'s biological child.2" Although
New York's statute allows either parent of a minor child residing within the
state to apply for a writ of habeas corpus, it leaves the term "parent" unde-
fined.219 Ettelbrick asserts that, while Alison D. brought the first case asking
215. Id. at 521.
216. Id. at 521-22 (citing Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); In re
Interest of Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991), overruled by In re Custody of H.S.H-K., 533
N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995)); see also supra notes 2-24 and accompanying text (discussingAlison
D.); supra notes 43-62 and accompanying text (discussing Z.J.H.). But see H.S.H.-K., 533
N.W.2d at 421 (departing significantly from decision in ZJ.H.); supra notes 67-81 and
accompanying text (discussing H.S.H.-K.).
217. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 522 n.38. The decision inAlisonD. and the arguments
that EtteIbrick presented in that case have given rise to a variety of articles, notes and comments
in law reviews, which generally urge new legal definitions of family. See Martha L. Minow,
Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 269, 270-84 (1991)
(discussing functional notion of family and noting author worked on Alison D. case); see also
Barbara J. Cox, Love Makes a Family-Nothing More, Nothing Less: How the Judicial System
Has Refusedto Protect Nonlegal Parents inAlternative Families, 8 J.L. & POL. 5, 60-67 (199 1)
(discussing barriers that make it difficult to achieve legislative change and arguing that courts
should "use the means available to them to protect nonlegal parents in alternative families);
William B. Rubenstein, We Are Family: A Reflection on the Search for Legal Recognition of
Lesbian and Gay Relationships, 8 J.L. &PoL. 89, 90-105 (1991) (reflecting on "challenges in
the search for legal recognition of lesbian and gay relationships"); Kimberly P. Carr, Comment,
Alison D. v. Virginia M.: Neglecting the Best Interests ofthe Child in a Nontraditional Family,
58 BROOK. L. REv. 1021, 1059-61 (1992) (recommending that courts determine best interests
of child and standing for visitation by analyzing relationship between petitioner and child);
Denise Glaser Malloy, Note, Another Mother?: The Courts'Denial ofLegal Status to the Non-
Biological Parent Upon Dissolution ofLesbian Families, 31 J. FAM. L. 981, 996-1002 (1993)
(calling for legislation to reflect needs of nonbiological parent in lesbian families and for courts
to recognize need for expanded interpretation of case law).
218. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 523.
219. N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 70(a) (McKinney Supp. 1997-98). The statute provides, in
pertinent part:
Where a minor child is residing within this state, either parent may apply to the
supreme court for a writ of habeas corpus to have such minor child brought before
such court; and on the return thereof, the court, on due consideration, may award
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any state's highest court to recognize "the relationship created by two lesbians
with their child, prior holdings in New York courts supported Alison's argu-
ment that functional parental relationships should be recognized."'
Ettelbrick reaches her conclusion on two bases. First, under the common
law in loco tarentis doctrine, courts in New York and many other states "had
recognized that one who assumes the obligations of a parent acquires the
relative rights and responsibilities of a parent.""2 Second, she finds it "curi-
ous, and somewhat inexplicable," that the court did not refer to its own earlier
decision in Braschi v. StahlAssociates Co.,' in which the court decided that
two homosexual men who lived together and who shared a financial and
emotional commitment to one another constituted a family unit for the pur-
poses of New York's rent control regulations.'
Despite Ettelbrick's criticisms, good reasons support the Alison D.
court's failure to cite the cases discussed by Ettelbrick. With respect to the
court's failure to mention the in loco parentis doctrine, the trial court and
intermediate appellate court cases Ettelbrick cites provide little, if any, sup-
port for Ettelbrick's position. n4 In People v. Lilly,' for example, the court
reversed the child abuse conviction of a criminal defendant, who caused the
death of a three-month-old child, because the trial court gave an erroneous
jury instruction that the defendant was obliged to provide medical assistance
to the child if he, the child, and the child's mother were living together as a
family unit. 6 The appellate court found that the instruction oversimplified
the in loco parentis doctrine. 7
the natural guardianship, charge and custody of such child to either parent for such
time, under such regulations and restrictions, and with such provisions and direc-
tions, as the case may require, and may at any time thereafter vacate or modify such
order. In all cases there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in
either parent, but the court shall determine solely what is for the best interest of the
child, and what will best promote its welfare and happiness, and make award
accordingly.
Id. Related sections of the Domestic Relations Law that provide standing to siblings and grand-
parents also refer to parent or parents without defining the terms. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW
§§ 71, 72 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1997-98).
220. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 523.
221. Id. at 523-24.
222. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
223. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 526; see Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49,
53-54 (N.Y. 1989) (discussing relationship at issue); see also infra notes 232-40 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Braschi).
224. See Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 524 n.45.
225. 422N.Y.S.2d 976 (App. Div. 1979).
226. People v. Lilly, 422 N.Y.S.2d 976, 977-78 (App. Div. 1979).
227. Id. at 978.
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In Trapp v. Trapp,28 the trial court denied a natural mother's motion to
dismiss a stepfather's visitation petition for lack of standing. 9 Although the
Trapp court made no reference to the in loco parentis doctrine, the court
explained that "[w]hetherthe nature ofthe relationship between petitioner and
the children... was such that its disruption would create an extraordinary
circumstance which would drastically affect the welfare of the children must
be judicially determined.""0 Neither Trap norLilly, nor any ofthe other cases
cited by Ettelbrick, justify her complaint against the court for failure to
mention the in loco parentis doctrine in support of Alison D's claim. 3
It is also neither curious nor inexplicable that the court in Alison D. did
not refer, even in passing, to Braschi v. StahlAssociates Co."S2 The appellant
in that case, Miguel Braschi, lived in a rent controlled apartment in New York
City with another male who was the tenant of record. 3 The owner of the
premises sought to evict Braschi after the death of the named tenant."
Braschi requested injunctive relief, claiming that he was entitled to be pro-
tected from eviction under New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations,
which prohibited the eviction of the surviving spouse of a deceased tenant of
a rent controlled apartment or of a member of the deceased tenant's family
who had been living with the tenant.25
A divided Court of Appeals narrowly defined the issue presented. The
court explained that "[r]esolution of this question requires this court to deter-
mine the meaning of the term 'family' as it is used in this context. " 6 It is
apparent from the court's opinion that it addressed this issue and this issue
only. The court observed that, "since rent-control laws are remedial in nature
and designed to promote the public good, their provisions should be inter-
preted broadly to effectuate their purposes.""r7 Next, the court examined the
legislative purpose of such laws, stating:
Rent control was enacted to address a "serious public emergency" created
by "an acute shortage in dwellings," which resulted in "speculative, unwar-
ranted and abnormal increases in rents." These measures were designed to
regulate and control the housing market so as to "prevent exactions of
unjust, unreasonable and oppressive rents and rental agreements and to
forestall profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices tending to
228. 480 N.Y.S.2d 979 (Fain. Ct. 1984).
229. Trapp v. Trapp, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979, 979-80 (Farn. Ct. 1984).
230. Id. at 980.
231. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 524 n.45 (citing New York in loco parentis cases).
232. See id. at 526 (describing court's failure to cite Braschi as curious and inexplicable).
233. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 50-51 (N.Y. 1989).
234. Id.
235. Id. at 50 (citing N.Y. COMP. CODES RL & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (1995)).
236. Id. (emphasis added).
237. Id. at 52.
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produce threats to the public health;... [and] to prevent uncertainty,
hardship and dislocation.""us
Thus, the court pointed out that the legislature undertook to control both rents
and evictions in order to accomplish the goals of rent control. In this limited
context, the Braschi court found that the term "family," as used in the regula-
tions governing rent and eviction in the City of New York, should not be
rigidly restricted to relationships formalized by marriage or adoption and that
[t]he intended protection against sudden eviction ... should find its foun-
dation in the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more
realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult
lifetime partners whose relationship is long term and characterized by an
emotional and financial commitment and interdependence."'
The court concluded that this definition of family was consistent with the
purposes of New York's rent control laws.4
In later decisions, New York courts have resisted invitations to give
Braschi a more expansive reading. In In re Cooper,"1 for example, an inter-
mediate appellate court found that the survivor of a homosexual relationship
was not entitled to a statutory election against the decedent's will as a surviv-
ing spouse. 2 In Cooper, the court cited its own opinion in Alison D., in
which it found "that a lesbian partner was not a 'parent' under [the relevant
statute] and rejected, as 'totally misplaced' the argument that the holding in
Braschi compelled a different result."243
Ettelbrick's suggestion that the Court of Appeals in Alison D. obviously
avoided a discussion of Braschi is at least questionable. She concludes that
"[m]ore than likely, the court simply did not want to give its stamp of approval
to lesbian families, particularly lesbian couples who are raising children
together."' However, such speculation finds no support in the Alison D.
opinion."
238. Id (citations omitted) (quoting N.Y. UNcoNsoL. LAW § 8581 (McKinney 1987 &
Supp. 1997-98)).
239. Id at 54.
240. Id.
241. 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (App. Div. 1993).
242. In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798-99 (App. Div. 1993).
243. Id at 799 (citations omitted) (quoting Alison D. v. Virginia M., 552 N.Y.S.2d 321,
324 (App. Div. 1990), affid, 572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991); see also Stewart v. Schwartz Bros.-
Jeffer Mem'l Chapel, Inc., 606 N.Y.S.2d 965 (Sup. Ct. 1993) (noting reluctance of courts to
expand Braschi from its original context). It should be noted that New York's intermediate
appellate court subsequently extended the ruling in Braschi from the context of rent control to
the context of rent stabilization, thereby expanding its coverage from about one hundred
thousand apartments to some one million apartments, and that amended regulations have
codified the decision. See Rubenstein, supra note 217, at 97.
244. Ettelbrick, supra note 208, at 531.
245. Ettelbrick is not the only commentator who engages in speculation about the reasons
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It would be naive to suggest that courts deciding custody and visitation
cases have generally been free of antihomosexual bias. Indeed, as I have
observed elsewhere:
The conduct of a parent that will most often affect custody is sexual con-
duct, sometimes disguised by references to "lifestyle." Courts generally
will consider a parent's heterosexual conduct outside of marriage or homo-
sexual conduct as one factor to be considered in a custody determination,
rather than as constituting unfitnessper se. Nevertheless, cases involving
lesbian or gay male custodians who maintain live-in or other relationships
with persons of the same sex often enough provokejudicialhigh dudgeon.246
Despite the presence of bias in some cases, however, nothing in the Alison D.
opinion suggests antihomosexual bias on the part of the majority of the New
York Court of Appeals.
IV A Proposed Standard
There is a strong and enduring tradition of family autonomy in American
law, of which the natural concomitant is parental authority.247 As one com-
mentator has observed:
The traditional view of our society is that the care, control, and custody of
children resides first in their parents; in fact "constitutional interpretation
has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of
for the court's decision in Alison D. See Rubenstein, supra note 217, at 100-05 (discussing
Alison D. and Braschi.). Rubenstein, a respected scholar and gay rights advocate, was co-
counsel for Miguel Braschi and argued the Braschi case before the New York Court of Appeals.
Id. at 90. He was also co-counsel for amicus curiae inAlison D. in both the Appellate Division
and in the Court of Appeals. Id. With respect to this latter case, he observes:
It is... difficult to discount the role that sexism played in the court's decision-
making. On the simplest level, Brasehi involved men, while Alison D. involved
women. More centrally, Alison D. involved the relationship between two women
and a child: the implication of the case - that two women could raise a child in the
absence of a man - had to be threatening, on some level to the male jurists consid-
ering the case. I don't say that lightly - consider the facts. TheAlison D. case was
heard by eleven jurists on its way through the New York state court system: nine
of them were men, two women. All of the nine men - the Supreme Court justices,
two of the three Appellate Division justices, and six of the seven judges of the
Court of Appeals - voted against Alison, while both of the female jurists - Justice
Sybil Hart Kooper on the Appellate Division and Judge Judith Kaye of the Court
of Appeals - voted for her.
Id. at 102.
246. JOHN DEwiTr GREGORY, UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW 377 (2d ed. 1993).
247. See CALEBFOOTEETAL., CASESANDMATERIALSONFAMILYLAW 1-26 (2d ed. 1976);
Bruce Hafen, Children's Liberation and the New Egalitarianism: Some Reservations About
Abandoning Youth to Their "Rights", 1976 BYUL.REV. 605,615-26 (discussing constitutional
and common law backgrounds of parental rights).
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our society" .... This parental interest in family relationships has been
defined as a liberty interest entitled to due process protection. 8
Beginning with Meyer v. Nebraska," in which the United States Supreme
Court explicitly recognized the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up
children" as a "liberty" guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Su-
preme Court has given strong support to the prerogative of parents vis-a-vis
the state250 In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,'"' the Court unequivocally reaf-
firmed this principle.52 Enjoining the enforcement ofthe Oregon Compulsory
Education Law against two private educational institutions, the Court ob-
served:
Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, we think it entirely plain that the
Act of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guard-
ians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.
As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may
not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State.... The child is not the mere
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for addi-
tional obligations.5 3
Thus, the Court concluded that the statute compelling public school atten-
dance could not be enforced. 4
Almost a half-century after Meyer and Pierce, the Supreme Court gave
a ringing reaffirmation to the principles of family autonomy and parental
authority. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,"3 5 the Court affirmed a judgment of the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin that invalidated the criminal convictions of
parents, who were members of the Old Order Amish religion, under the state
compulsory education law." The Court quoted with approval its language
248. Ellen B. Wells, Unanswered Questions: Standing and Party Status of Children in
Custody and Visitation Proceedings, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 95, 109 (1995). Another
commentator accurately observes that the Supreme Court "has consistently held that matters
touching on natural parent-child relationships and involving the custody and control of one's
children are fundamental liberty and privacy interests protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
As such, they are entitled to the greatest constitutional protection." Marian L. Faupel, The
"Baby Jessica Case" and the Claimed Conflict Between Children's and Parents'Rights, 40
WAYNE L. REV. 285, 289 (1994).
249. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
250. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
251. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
252. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
253. Id. (citation omitted).
254. Id.
255. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
256. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).
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from Pierce, characterizing Pierce as "perhaps the most significant statement
of the Court in this area." 7 The Court further observed:
[T]his case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with
that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their chil-
dren. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong
tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their chil-
dren. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children
is now established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.25s
In addition to this strong endorsement of parental authority, the Court has
repeatedly reaffirmed the principle of family autonomy. 9
In light of the Supreme Court's undisturbed precedent supporting family
autonomy and parental authority, the persistence of several academic com-
mentators and some state courts in seeking to invent new rights for legal
strangers raises serious questions. Such efforts minimize or ignore, and, in
effect, reject the long line of Supreme Court pronouncements that acknowl-
edge and protect the constitutional liberty interests of parents in their relation-
ships with and custody and control over their own children.
Courts have generally recognized visitation as a subspecies or limited
form of custody.260 As New York's highest court observed in Alison D. v.
Virginia M, "[t]o allow the courts to award visitation - a limited form of
custody - to a third person would necessarily impair the parents' right to
custody and control." '6 Like custody, visitation implicates the physical
257. Id. at 232.
258. Id.
259. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753-54 (1982) (stating that natural parent is
entitled to due process at state-initiated parental rights termination proceeding); Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 843-44 (1977) (outlining procedures required
to remove foster children from foster homes); Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,
639-40 (1974) (holding that mandatory termination provisions for pregnant public school
teachers violate due process); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that state
statute that allows removal of children from custody of unwed father upon death of mother
violates due process rights of father); May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 534 (1952) (ruling that
Wisconsin decree does not bind Ohio court in habeas corpus proceeding attacking right of
mother to retain possession of minor children); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166
(1944) (stating that certain areas of family life exist which state cannot enter); Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding that state statute providing for sterilization of
criminals violates prisoner rights).
260. See Ronald FF. v. Cindy GG., 511 N.E.2d 75,77 (N.Y. 1987) (describing visitation
as subspecies of custody); see also Jackson v. Fitzgerald, 185 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C. 1962)
(stating that "right of visitation derives from the right to custody"); Commonwealth ex rel.
Williams v. Miller, 385 A.2d 992, 994 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (noting that "visitation is correla-
tive to custody").
261. Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 29 (N.Y. 1991). Curiously, the lone
dissenter inAlisonD. observed that "Itihis is not a custody case, but solely avisitation petition."
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control of children, and "the principles, rules, and considerations that guide
custody cases greatly influence the outcome in cases involving the visitation
rights of parents." '262 Nevertheless, many judges and an increasing number of
academic commentators either fail to take into account or give little deference
to the interests of natural parents, as well as the fundamentally important and
long recognized values that underlie these interests. Instead, they urge resolu-
tion of visitation disputes between natural parents and legal strangers in
accordance with the best interests of the child.263
Child custody and visitation disputes arise most often in connection with
divorce. Upon dissolution of marriage in cases where there are children,
courts ordinarily will award custody to one parent and visitation rights to the
noncustodial parent.21 In these adjudications, in which the custody determi-
nation involves two fit parents, the generally prevailing standard mandates
resolution in accord with the best interest of the child.26 Modem statutes
frequently reflect this standard in explicit language.' Perhaps this standard
is serviceable when a custody or visitation dispute is between two natural fit
parents. Nevertheless, in light of the principles of family autonomy and
parental authority recognized by the Supreme Court, application of this
standard to resolve a visitation dispute between a fit natural parent and a legal
stranger is highly questionable and inappropriate.
A number ofjudges and commentators have subjected the best interests
of the child standard to the unrelenting barrage of thoughtful criticism that it
deserves.267 In an early and frequently cited article, Professor Robert
Mnookin set out "to expose the inherent indeterminacy of the best-interests
standard., 268 In addition, one group of behavioral scientists has said of the
standard: "Tojudges, too often, [the best interests rule] is the cloak ofjudicial
Id. at 30 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
262. Melanie Myers Bronfim, Note, Louisiana Family Law - The Visitation Rights of a
Noncustodial Parent, 59 TuL. L. REV. 487, 488 (1984).
263. Carter v. Brodrick, 644 P.2d 850, 855 (Alaska 1982); Spradling v. Harris, 778 P.2d
365, 370 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632 (Ky. 1992); Carr, supra
note 217, at 1022-23.
264. GREGORY, supra note 246, at 353.
265. See CLARK, supra note 161, § 20.4, at 876 (discussing factors that influence resolu-
tion of custody disputes between natural parents).
266. GREGORY, supra note 246, at 371.
267. For an excellent and detailed summary of criticisms of the best interests standard see
Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law: Child Custody and the UMDA 's Best-Interest
Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215, 2219-25 (1991).
268. RobertH. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of
Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CO'NTEMP. PROBs. 226, 256 (Summer 1975); see also Jon Elster,
Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54 U. CaI. L. REv. 1, 11-12
(1987) (arguing that best interest standard is indeterminate and fails to yield just decisions).
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security, in which they can hide fuzzy thinking, uninformed opinions, laziness,
frustration, and even out-and-out prejudice."269 In a similar vein, Professor
Robert J. Levy decries "the invitation the 'best interests' standard's indetermi-
nate qualities offers to judges to award custody to those litigants whose
attributes and values most resemble their own."27 Finally, in the course of
discussing new reproductive technologies, Professor Janet L. Dolgin observes:
Application of the standard does not, and probably cannot, serve the best
interests of children in custody cases, because particular custody decisions
under the best-interest standard depend on the insight and wisdom, and
thus the world-view, of individual judges. As a result, widespread dis-
agreements about how to imagine and apply the standard are inevitable.271
Professor David L. Chambers points out that despite the seeming flexibil-
ity, simplicity, and egalitarianism of the best interests standard, decisions
under such flexible and open standards frequently reach either overreaching
or arbitrary results . 2  He notes that "[m]any people criticize judges who
decide custody cases for giving inappropriate expression to personal or sexist
biases. In our peculiarly American tradition, the decisions are regarded not
merely as arbitrary but as discriminatory as well. ,273 Professor Chambers goes
on to identify two deeper and more fundamental problems reflected in the best
interests standard. The first critical problem, he observes, is "that to the
extent that judges are applying the wrong values, it is in large part because
legislatures have failed to convey a collective social judgment about the right
values. 2'74 A second difficulty with the standard, which Professor Chambers
describes as "more mundane but no less serious," is that "[r]egardless of what
values judges apply, they do not obtain, and perhaps can never routinely
obtain, reliable information about the child and the parents, and thus they
cannot make sensible predictions or choices.,
275
In the context of a wide-ranging discussion of fixed rules and discretion
in American family law and succession law, Professor Mary Ann Glendon
observes:
The "best interests" standard is a prime example of the futility of attempt-
ing to achieve perfect, individualized justice by reposing discretion in a
269. BENiAMiN M. SCHULTZ ET AL., SOLOMON'S SwoRDI 1 (1989).
270. Robert J. Levy, Rights andResponsibilitiesfor Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM.
L.Q. 191, 197 (1993).
271. Janet L. Dolgin, Suffer the Children: Nostalgia, Contradiction and the New Repro-
ductive Technologies, 28 ARIz. ST. L.J. 473, 495 (1996).
272. See David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 481 (1984).
273. Id.
274. Id. at481-82.
275. Id. at 482.
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judge or other third party. Its vagueness provides maximum incentive to
those who are inclined to wrangle over custody, and it asks the judge to do
what is almost impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a mother
and a father at a time when family relations are apt to be most distorted by
the stress of separation and the divorce process itself. Arguing that the
idea that a judge can determine the best interests of a child under such
circumstances is a fantasy, and that efforts for legal reform should concen-
trate on the effect of custody law on private ordering, Robert Burt has
suggested that almost any automatic rule would be an improvement over
the present situation. 6
In sum, the best interests of the child standard is both vague and indeter-
minate and gives precious little guidance to judicial decision makers. It pro-
vides to judges the invitation, which they frequently accept with alacrity, to
engage in virtually untrammeled exercises of discretion in deciding issues of
child custody and visitation. It serves poorly the interests of children in
custody or visitation cases, speaking ratherto the interests of contending adults.
The standard lacks any settled meaning and is more a rubric than an
analytical tool for deciding child custody and visitation cases. It has meant
different things at different points in time. The tender years doctrine, for
example, was an effort to articulate what is in the best interests of children
based on the age of the children involved.277 Under another tradition, long
since rejected, trial courts commonly awarded custody on the basis of sex."'
The notion of psychological parent is yet another effort to describe what is in
the best interests of the child, this time from a psychological perspective. 9
276. Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); see JAMES C. BLACK & DONALD J.
CANTOR, CHILD CUSTODY 42 (1990). Black and Cantor explain:
Leaving judges with an ultimate standard but with no real guidance on how to
satisfy it puts them in a position of having only two ways to do their job: either
they follow their own instincts or they rely on the expertise of others. Following
their own instincts is simply another way of saying that they act in a vacuum, a
philosophical vacuum, in which their particular experience, upbringing, biases, and,
perhaps, irrationalities lead them to a conc[l]usion. This form of decision-making
is not only personal, bearing no necessary relation to what another judge might
decide on the facts, but also utterly without any necessary relation to what is best
for the child in question.
Id.
277. See IRA MARK ELLMAN -T AL., FAMILY LAW: CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 502-03 (2d
ed. 1991); Ramsay Laing Klaff, The Tender Years Doctrine: A Defense, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335,
344-45 (1982).
278. See ELLMANETAL., supra note 277, at 503, 508.
279. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEINETAL., BEYONDTHEBESTINTERESTS OFTHE CHILD 17-20 (2d
ed. 1979); see also Nancy Goldhill, Ties That Bind: The Impact of Psychological and Legal
Debates on the Child Welfare System, 22 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 295, 297 (1996).
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It is obvious that these various ways of understanding what is in the best
interests of children frequently are in conflict with each other. Because it is
impossible even to define the best interests standard, it is quixotic to expect
that judges will apply it on a principled basis. Rather, it presents the arguably
irresistible temptation to exercise unfettered discretion in deciding what is in
the best interests of the child.
Despite the criticisms just discussed and the skepticism with which so
many commentators have viewed the best interests of the child standard, it
retains its vitality as the prevailing rule in child custody determinations. Not
only does the standard apply in custody or visitation disputes between two fit
parents on the occasion of divorce, but it also frequently persists in visitation
contests between fit parents and legal strangers. It is the dominant standard
in statutes that permit third party visitation by grandparents, stepparents, and
other petitioners under a variety of circumstances. Even when the legislature
has been silent with respect to visitation by legal strangers, courts nevertheless
have invoked the best interests of the child standard to permit it.28
The Supreme Court of Kentucky decision in King v. King21 provides a
paradigmatic illustration of the unfettered and unprincipled application of the
best interests of the child standard to permit visitation by third parties in
derogation of the principles of family autonomy and parental authority.8 2 The
case arose in the context of grandparent visitation, the area in which third
parties seeking visitation, aided significantly by statutory enactments, have
been most successful.
283
In King, the trial court ordered visitation by a paternal grandfather with
his female granddaughter, after the child's married parents denied the grandfa-
ther's request to see the child following a family dispute.2 On appeal, the
Supreme Court of Kentucky identified two issues: the constitutionality of the
applicable statute, which authorized the trial court to grant reasonable visita-
tion to a grandparent upon a finding that visitation was in the best interests of
the child;28" and whether the trial court erred in finding that grandparent
visitation served the child's best interests.286
280. See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 572 N.E.2d 27, 31 (N.Y. 1991) (Kaye, J., dissenting);
J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314, 1320-21 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K,
533 N.W.2d 419, 434 (Wis. 1995).
281. 828 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1992).
282. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 632-33 (Ky. 1992).
283. See David L. Walther, Survey of Grandparents' Visitation Rights, 11 AM. J. FAM. L.
95, 96 (1997) (noting that all fifty states recognize grandparent visitation rights to some extent).
284. King, 828 S.W.2d at 630-31 (explaining that parents denied visitation rights to
grandfather after he ordered family to move out of house located on grandfather's farm).
285. Id. at 631; Ky. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 405.021 (Michie 1984).
286. King, 828 S.W.2d at 632.
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In its brief opinion, the court answered both questions affirmatively,
rejecting the parents' argument that "the statute... constitute[d] an unwar-
ranted intrusion into the liberty interest of parents to rear their children as they
see fit."'287 With respect to the constitutional issue, the court relied upon
Meyer v. Nebraska and acknowledged "the right to rear children without
undue governmental interference."2"' In support of its assertion that the "right
is not inviolate," the court noted the law's requirements that parents must
provide for their children's education and that children must be inoculated
against disease, restrained when riding in motor vehicles, and restricted in
employment.289
Having reluctantly tipped its judicial hat to the principle of family
autonomy, the court turned to the statute before it and concluded:
This statute seeks to balance the fundamental rights of the parents, grand-
parents and the child. At common law, grandparents had no legal right to
visitation. However, the General Assembly determinedthat, in modem day
society, it was essential that some semblance of family and generational
contact be preserved. If a grandparent is physically, mentally and morally
fit, then a grandchild will ordinarily benefit from contact with the grand-
parent. That grandparents and grandchildren normally have a special bond
cannot be denied. Each benefits from contact with the other. The child
can learn respect, a sense ofresponsibility and love. The grandparent can
be invigorated by exposure to youth, can gain an insight into our changing
society, and can avoid the loneliness which is so often apart of an aging
parent's life. These considerations by the state do not go too far in intrud-
ing into the fundamental rights of the parents.2 '
On this basis, the court held that the statute in question was constitutional and,
not surprisingly, that visitation was in the best interests of the child.291
A dissenting opinion in King cogently and accurately characterized the
opinion of the majority:
The opinion of the majority makes little pretense of constitutional analysis
but depends entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent value in
visitation between grandparent and grandchild, regardless of the wishes of
the parents. The fatal flaw in the majority opinion is its conclusion that a
grandparent has a "fundamental right" to visitation with a grandchild. No
authority is cited for this proposition as there is no such right.2"
287. Id. at 63 1.
288. Id
289. Id
290. Id. at 632 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
291. Id. at 632-33.
292. Id at 633 (Lambert, J., dissenting).
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Unfortunately, the court's opinion in King is not merely an isolated example
of the "best interests of the child" doctrine run rampant. In Herndon v.
Tuhey,29 the Supreme Court of Missouri addressed the constitutionality of a
statute that authorized the court to grant reasonable visitation rights to grand-
parents if visitation was unreasonably denied for more than ninety days.294
The statute required the court to determine whether visitation would be in the
child's best interest or would endanger the physical health or impair the
emotional development of the child.295 It permitted an order of visitation only
"when the court finds such visitation to be in the best interests of the child." '296
In Herndon, after several arguments with the parents that included
physical altercations and legal actions involving money and property, the
grandparents of a ten-year-old boy sought court-ordered visitation with their
grandson.297 As in King, the court found the visitation statute to be constitu-
tional and rejected the parents' assertion of their "basic constitutional right to
raise their children as they see fit, free from state intrusion absent a showing
of harm to the child." 298
While purporting to acknowledge the constitutional right of parents "to
make decisions affecting the family," the Herndon court asserted that "the
magnitude of the infringement by the state is a significant consideration in
determining whether a statute will be struck down as unconstitutional."299 The
Missouri court cited a lengthy portion of the Kentucky Supreme Court's
opinion in King and concluded:
Missouri's statute is reasonable both because it contemplates only a mini-
mal intrusion on the family relationship and because it is narrowly tailored
to adequately protect the interests of parents and children.... A court may
grant visitation only if it will be in the best interest of the child. If visita-
tion would endanger the child physically, mentally, or emotionally then
visitation must be denied.3°
The Missouri court's conclusion reflects enthusiastic agreement with the
Kentucky court's erroneous ruling in King. Undeniably, as one dissenting
293. 857 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. 1993).
294. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Mo. 1993).
295. Id. (citing Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.402 (West 1997)).
296. Id.
297. Id. at 204-06.
298. Id at 207.
299. Id at 208.
300. Id. at 210; see also Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P.2d 635, 641-42 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) (upholding statute that permitted reasonable visitation rights to grandparents and other
immediate family members if visitation served children's best interests). The Utah court
explained: "While parents have a constitutional right to make decisions affecting the family,
the degree of infringement by the state is a significant consideration in determining whether
courts will strike a statute down as unconstitutional." Id.
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opinion pointed out, the decision of the majority of the court "rests in actuality
upon the court's discretion, ratherthan upon traditional principles of constitu-
tional analysis."30 1 Furthermore, "[a] best interest test standing alone does not
justify intrusion into the parents' constitutionally protected right of autonomy
in child rearing.""302
The holdings in King and Herndon are among the most blatant examples
of the exercise of virtually unlimited judicial discretion in derogation of the
constitutionally recognized principle of family autonomy. The recent decision
of the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Michael v. Hertzler,"3 upholding that
state's grandparent visitation statute is no less troubling."' The statute under
review provided, in pertinent part, for an original action by a grandparent
against the custodian of a minor grandchild."' Alternative conditions for such
an action included the death or divorce of the grandparent's child who is the
minor grandchild's parent and the custodian's refusal of reasonable visitation
to the grandparent, or the grandchild's residence with the grandparent for
more than six consecutive months and the refusal of visitation after return to
the custodial parents.3" If one of the alternative conditions existed, the court
could award visitation to the grandparents upon a finding that visitation would
be in the child's best interests without substantial impairment of the rights of
the parents." 7
The court stated that parental rights are fundamental and that the court
must test the statute's constitutionality under a standard of strict scrutiny. °8
The court concluded that a compelling state interest justified the statute and
that the statute was constitutional.3" The court also acknowledged that the
defendant father's fundamental right to raise his child is a constitutionally
protected liberty interest.10 Nevertheless, reviewing authority from other
301. Hemdon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203,206-07 (Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting).
302. Id
303. 900 P.2d 1144 (Wyo. 1995).
304. Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1145 (Wyo. 1995).
305. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1146 (citing WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1994)).
306. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101 (Michie 1994).
307. Id. Wyoming has since amended its statute. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 20-7-101
(Michie 1997). The current version retains the best interest of the child standard, but has
eliminated the language describing specific situations in which grandparents may bring an
action for visitation rights. Id
308. Michael, 900 P.2d at 1145.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 1147. As examples of limitations on the liberty interests of parents, the court
cited several United States Supreme Court cases. Id. at 1147-48; see Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S.
622, 650-51 (1979) (holding that state could restrict minor's right to obtain abortion by
requiring parental consent only if state provided for alternative judicial proceeding for bypass-
ing parental consent); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 606-07 (1979) (concluding that child was
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 351 (1998)
jurisdictions upholding visitation statutes, the court found a compelling state
interest also exists in protecting the best interests of the child.31" ' Accordingly,
the court concluded:
Following the lead of the courts of our sister jurisdictions, we perceive a
compelling state interest in the State of Wyoming which justifies the grand-
parent visitation statute, perhaps more so. The statute specifically adopts
the best interest of the child as a standard which we perceive as represent-
ing a compelling state interest in the state's role asparenspatriae.312
The court then purported to weigh the "compelling interest of the State
in protecting the best interest of the child" against the fundamental liberty
right of the child's natural parent.31 3 First, pursuant to various statutory provi-
sions, the state may intrude upon parental rights in order to protect children
from abuse or neglect, with the power to terminate parental rights under
appropriate circumstances.314 The court cited other "examples of the manifes-
tation of the state interest in protecting children."315 For example, in the exer-
cise of the state's parens patriae role, there are statutes requiring parents to
use child seats in automobiles and to send their children to school.316 The
court also noted that intervening in the best interests of the child, courts have
awarded temporary custody to grandparents upon a showing of neglect or
physical abuse of a child by the child's natural parent.1 Finally, citing the
Supreme Court's recognition of children as "'persons' within the meaning of
the Bill of Rights," the court asserted that the right to associate with one's
family, a fundamental liberty under the Wyoming Constitution, was "an
equivalent fundamental right to that asserted by [the child's parent]. It is
available to children and grandparents, as well as parents, and the state has an
equal duty to protect the fundamental rights of the grandparents and the
children."31 Accordingly, the court held that the grandparent visitation statute
was constitutional and concluded that, "in addition to the compelling state
interest attaching to the best interest of the children, the compelling state
entitled to hearing prior to commitment to mental institution by parents); Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 168, 170-71 (1944) (noting that "the state's authority over children's
activities is broader than over like actions of adults" and deciding that state statute proscribing
child labor was constitutional).
311. Michael v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1148-49 (Wyo. 1995).
312. Id at 1149.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 1149-50.
315. Id. at 1150.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. (citingTinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503,511(1969)).
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interest exists in maintaining the right of association of grandparents and
grandchildren." '319
After the Kentucky Supreme Court's decision in King v. King, Professor
Laurence Nolan identified "a trend to extend grandparent visitation statutes
to the traditional intact family."32 If this was true when Professor Nolan
made the observation, later events suggest that the direction the law will take
with respect to visitation by grandparents and by other third parties is far from
clear. If such a trend exists, in several recent cases courts have been loath to
follow it. 2'
Before examining these recent cases, one should recall that in both King
and in Herndon the tortured reasoning of the courts provoked strong
dissents." In King, for example, the author of the dissenting opinion sharply
criticized the majority for "mak[ing] little pretense of constitutional analysis
but depend[ing] entirely on the sentimental notion of an inherent value in
visitation between grandparent and grandchild."3" The dissenter identified
as the "fatal flaw" in the court's opinion its conclusion, without citation of
319. Id at 1151; see Emanuel S. v. Joseph E., 577 N.E.2d 27, 28-30 (N.Y. 1991) (discuss-
ing right of grandparents to seek visitation rights). In Emanuel S., New York's highest court
addressed the issue of whether the state's grandparent visitation statute "may be applied to grant
standing to grandparents seeking visitation with a grandchild when the nuclear family is intact
and the parents object to visitation." Id. at 28. Section 72 of New York's Domestic Relations
Law gives grandparents standing to sue when a parent has died and also "where circumstances
show that conditions exist which (sic) equity would see fit to intervene." N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW
§ 72 (McKinney Supp. 1997-98). The court granted the grandfather's petition, finding "nothing
in the statutory language or legislative history foreclosing petitioner solely on the grounds that
the grandchild resides with fit parents in an intact nuclear family." Emmanuel S., 571 N.E.2d
at 29. The parents asserted that a grant of visitation over their objections when they were
neither separated nor unfit would violate their constitutional rights. Id. at 30. Stating that the
question was not before it, the court adroitly avoided the constitutional issue: "We are not
addressing an award of visitation, but only whether petitioner has standing to seek it." Id.
320. Laurence C. Nolan, Honor Thy Father and Thy Mother: But Court-Ordered Grand-
parent Visitation in the Intact Family?, 8 BYUJ. PUB. L. 51, 52 (1993).
321. See Castagno v. Wholean, 684A.2d 1181,1189 (Conn. 1996) (holdingthattrial court
has jurisdiction to entertain third party's visitation petition only when minor child's family life
has been sufficiently disrupted to justify other intervention); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1276 (Fla. 1996) (holding that statute allowing visitation over parents' objection in intact family
violates parents' fundamental rights); Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773 (Ga. 1995)
(holding that grandparent visitation statute violates constitutionally protected interest ofparents
to raise their children without undue state interference); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 577
(Tenn. 1993) (holding that application of grandparent's visitation act to married couple whose
fitness as parents was unchallenged violated state constitutional right to privacy in parenting
decisions).
322. See supra notes 292,301-02 and accompanying text (discussing King and Herndon
dissents).
323. King v. King, 828 S.W.2d 630, 633 (Ky. 1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting).
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authority, "that a grandparent has a 'fundamental right' to visitation with a
grandchild."324 The opinion concluded: "Absent a showing of harm to the
child, there is no compelling state interest in intervention into the affairs of an
autonomous family and any statute which authorizes such intervention vio-
lates the parents' liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment."3"
Similarly, the dissenter in Herndon observed that "[t]he majority opin-
ion's holding rests in actuality upon a trial court's discretion, rather than
upon traditional principles of constitutional analysis."326 The opinion appro-
priately concluded that "[a] best interest test standing alone does not justify
intrusion into the parents' constitutionally protected right of autonomy in
child rearing."327
The principles reflected in the dissents in King and Herndon have found
their way into decisions in grandparent visitation cases in a number ofjuris-
dictions. The first such significant decision was that of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee in Hawk v. Hawk,328 which held that the state's grandparent visita-
tion statute was unconstitutional.329 Two years later, the Supreme Court of
Georgia reached a similar result in Brooks v. Parkerson.33 Finally, in Beagle
v. Beagle,33' Florida's highest court held that a statute permitting grandparent
visitation in an intact family was constitutionally infirm.332
In Hawk, the parents of two minor children determined that association
with the paternal grandparents was no longer appropriate because of a long
history of family disputes.333 The grandparents sought court-ordered visitation
under a Tennessee statute that permitted a court to order reasonable visitation
by grandparents with a minor child when visitation was in the child's best
interests.3 34 The trial court, although it did not find the parents unfit, neverthe-
less ordered liberal visitation by finding that family conflicts should not
interfere with the relationship between the children and their grandparents.33
The Supreme Court of Tennessee reversed the trial court's decision. It
found the statute violated the right to privacy under the Tennessee Constitu-
tion "as applied to [a] married couple, whose fitness as parents is unchal-
324. Id.
325. Id. at 635.
326. Herndon v. Tuhey, 857 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Mo. 1993) (Covington, J., dissenting).
327. Id.
328. 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993).
329. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tenn. 1993).
330. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 770 (Ga. 1995).
331. 678 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1996).
332. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).
333. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 575.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 577.
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lenged. '336 Although its decision was based on the state constitutional provi-
sion, the court observed that "the right to rear one's children is so firmly
rooted in our culture that the United States Supreme Court has held it to be a
fundamental~liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution.
3 37
In the course of a careful review of Supreme Court decisions, the court
observed that although it is "often expressed as a 'liberty' interest, the protec-
tion of 'childrearing autonomy' reflects the Court's larger concern with
privacy rights for the family.038 Further, the court rejected the grandparents'
assertion that a finding of visitation to be in the childrens' best interests
creates a compelling state interest that overrides objections to visitation by fit
parents.339 Instead, the court noted that both federal and Tennessee cases and
statutory law require that state interference with a parent's right to raise a
child be based on a showing of harm to a child's welfare.34° The court ex-
plained:
[W]ithout a substantial danger of harm to the child, a court may not consti-
tutionally impose its own subjective notions of the "best interests of the
child" when an intact, nuclear family with fit, married parents is involved.
By holding that an initial showing of harm to a child is necessary before
the state may intervene to determine the "best interests of the child," we
approve the reasoning of both Tennessee and federal cases that have
balanced various state interests against parental privacy rights.
34'
In a later case before the Tennessee Supreme Court, Simmons v.
Simmons ,32 the paternal grandparents of a five-year-old child asserted a right
to visitation over the objections of the child's natural mother and adopting
father.3 The petitioning grandparents argued thatthe court's earlier decision
in Hawk, in which the family was intact and the children not in substantial
danger of harm, was not applicable.3
In Simmons, the grandparents asserted that constitutional protection was
"limited to married, natural parents who have maintained continuous custody
of their children and whose fitness as parents has not been challenged.
345
336. Id. (citing TENN. CONST. art. I, § 8)
337. Id. at 578.
338. Id. (citation omitted).
339. Id. at 579.
340. Id at 580-81.
341. Id at 579-80.
342. 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995).
343. Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682, 682 (Tenn. 1995).
344. Id at 684.
345. Id
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They argued that, in light of the parents' divorce and the child's adoption by
a stepparent, state intervention was not constitutionally precluded.346 The
court denied visitation to the grandparents and held that in the absence of a
substantial danger of harm to the child the parenting decisions of both adop-
tive parents and natural parents are constitutionally protected from state
intrusion.347
The decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia in Brooks v. Parkerson
represents a further erosion of the best interest of the child standard in third
party visitation cases that involve grandparents.348 The Georgia statute per-
mitted the court to "grant any grandparent ... reasonable visitation rights
upon proof of special circumstances which make such visitation rights neces-
sary to the best interests of the child." '349 The court held that the statute was
unconstitutional under both the federal and state constitutions "because it does
not clearly promote the health and welfare of the child and does not require
a showing of harm before state interference is authorized.
3 50
In Beagle v. Beagle, the Supreme Court of Florida struck down as uncon-
stitutional a statutory amendment that provided for grandparent visitation in
cases involving intact families.35' The provision in question required the court
to award reasonable grandparent visitation rights despite a married natural
parent's prohibition, if the visitation would be in the minor child's best inter-
est, regardless of whether there was a broken relationship between the child's
parents and grandparents.352
After a brief summary of the "divergent views in otherjurisdictions as to
whether the government can constitutionally infringe upon the rights of
parents to raise their children 3 53 and a discussion of the legislative history of
the Florida grandparent visitation right,"14 the court turned to the "very nar-
row" issue before it: "Does the State have a compelling state interest in
346. Id.
347. Id. at 684-85.
348. Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 774 (Ga. 1995).
349. Id. at 770-71 (citing GA. CODEANN. § 19-7-3(c) (1988)). Georgia has since amended
the visitation statute. The statute now allows visitation rights for grandparents when a "court
finds the health or welfare of a child would be harmed unless such visitation is granted, and if
the best interests of the child would be served by such visitation." GA. CoDEANN. § 19-7-3(c)
(Supp. 1997).
350. Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 774.
351. Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 1996).
352. Id. at 1273 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 752.01 (1)(e) (West 1997)).
353. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1274-76 (citing Brooks, 454 S.E.2d at 773; Herndon v. Tuhey,
857 S.W.2d 203,211 (Mo. 1993); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573,579 (Tenn. 1993); Michael
v. Hertzler, 900 P.2d 1144, 1151 (Wyo. 1995)).
354. Beagle, 678 So. 2d at 1275.
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imposing grandparental visitation rights, in an intact family, over the objection
of at least one parent?""3 ' The court, observing that "[o]ur cases have made
it abundantly clear that the State can satisfy the compelling state interest
standard when it acts to prevent demonstrable harm to a child," held that the
amended statute did not show such a compelling state interest.5 6
Although the constitutional brake that these recent cases have placed on
grandparent visitation may not be directly in response to the observations of
a number of academic critics, they clearly reflect the criticism. More than a
decade ago, by which time most states had enacted statutes providing for
court-ordered visitation by grandparents and other third parties, Professor
KathleenBean sounded alarums aboutthe rarity of"[d]octrinal, constitutional,
or policy-oriented analyses" in court decisions granting visitation under the
best interest of the child standard, with little guidance from the Supreme
Court.357 Professor Bean describes three major deficiencies in the deci-
sions.358 She notes the failure of courts granting visitation to consider the
authority for state intervention in the family, the failure to provide "an inter-
vening constitutional construction for an analysis that begins and ends with
the best interest of the child standard, and the determination of best interest
"with scant reference to the needs of the particular child involved,... over-
shadowed by the court's desire to contribute to the maintenance of a grand-
parent-grandchild relationship.u
359
Professor Bean notes at the outset of her examination of the state's
authority to intervene in families by awarding grandparent visitation rights
that it is necessary to identify "the boundary between the family's authority
to make decisions concerning visitation for the child and the state's authority
to exercise its parens patriae power in the best interest of the child."360 Then,
the best interest standard "must be applied within constitutional confines and,
as a matter of public policy, should be so applied," which would proscribe
court- ordered grandparent visitation absent a showing of harm to the child
that results from family decision making or a lack of decision making.
31
Further, Professor Bean observes:
The harm to the child should be discernible without consideration of the
sentimental weight courts assign to maintaining a relationship with grand-
parents. Once harm is shown, the benefit of grandparent visitation for the
355. Id, at 1276.
356. Id.
357. Kathleen S. Bean, Grandparent Visitation: Can the Parent Refuse?, 24 J. FAM. L.
393, 393-94 (1985-86).
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child may be considered, but only in the context of the court's consider-
ation of what action will remedy that child's harm. If grandparent visita-
tion will remedy or address that harm, and the intrusion of court-ordered
visitation is justified by the benefits to the child, court-ordered visitation
is appropriate and constitutionally permissible. 62
These prescient early observations may well be a harbinger of the constitu-
tionally ordained judicial rejection of the Tennessee grandparent visitation
statute in Hawk and subsequent decisions invalidating statutes in Georgia and
Florida. 63 Simply stated, the tide may be turning."
In a comprehensive discussion of the Tennessee Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Hawk, Professor Joan Bohl begins with the observation that "[t]he
linchpin of the court's decision was that appellants, as the fit, married parents
of the children in question, possessed a right to autonomy in child rearing
decisions and that the parents and children together possessed a privacy right
as a family."365 Bohl argues for the application of the principles in Hawk
"to every grandparent visitation suit brought to override the united wishes of
married parents." '366 In a later work addressing grandparent visitation, Bohl
again apparently limited her condemnation to instances of state intrusion into
intact families "where fit married parents decide grandparent visitation is not
in their offspring's best interest." '367
The analysis of another commentator, Cynthia Greene, similarly typifies
the views of those who would fault on constitutional grounds only "court-
ordered grandparent visitation over the objection of the child's parents in an
intact marriage.""36 Greene describes two types of grandparent visitation
statutes. The earliest enactments, while adopting the best interests of the child
362. Id. at 394-95; see also J.C. Bohl, Brave New Statutes: Grandparent Visitation
Statutes as Unconstitutional Invasions of Family Life and Invalid Exercises of State Power, 3
GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTs. L.J. 271,297-98 (1993) (arguing that open-ended grandparent visita-
tion statutes are unconstitutional),
363. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d 769, 773-74 (Ga. 1995) (finding Georgia statute
unconstitutional because it failed to promote clearly the health or welfare of child and did not
require showing of harm before authorizing intervention); Beagle v. Beagle, 678 So. 2d 1271,
1277 (Fla. 1996) (finding Florida visitation statute facially unconstitutional).
364. See Cynthia L. Greene, Grandparents' Visitation Rights: Is the Tide Turning?, 12
J. AM. AcAD. MATRIM. LAW 1, 71-72 (1994) (discussing recent case law addressing constitu-
tional issues involved in state-compelled grandparent visitation statutes and concluding that
"open ended" grandparent visitation statutes soon will be declared unconstitutional).
365. Joan C. Bohl, Hawk v. Hawk: An Important Step in the Reform of Grandparent
Visitation Law, 33 J. FAM. L. 55, 55 (1995).
366. Id. at 55.
367. Joan C. Bohl, The "Unprecedented Intrusion:" A Survey and Analysis of Selected
Grandparent Visitation Cases, 49 OKLA. L. REv. 29, 36 (1996).
368. Greene, supra note 364, at 52.
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standard, require such special circumstances as the death of a parent or
divorce before grandparents may assert a recognizable right to visitation."9
Later statutes, also reflecting a best interest standard, permit court-ordered
visitation regardless of the situation of a particular family.37 Greene asserts
that a constitutional distinction exists between cases that involve intact
families and those in which the parents' marriage is no longer intact. 7' In the
latter cases, she argues that "the state has a legitimate purpose in seeking to
mitigate the potential harm to the child caused by the traumatic break-up of
the family unit."372 Greene concludes:
Thus, the constitutional distinction between the two types of grandparent
statutes is that children in intact families do not have such a "demonstrated
need for extraordinary state protection" and, therefore, "in light of the
parents' constitutionally recognized right to the care, custody, andmanage-
ment of their child, the legislature may not provide for a grandparent, over
the objection of parents living with their child in an intact family, to peti-
tion for visitation with his or her grandchild.""3
Greene's distinction is not persuasive. It does not accurately reflect the
teaching of the United States Supreme Court in a long line of cases that have
established and have reinforced time and again the principle of parental
authority.374 Greene properly acknowledges that "[t]he key to all of these
decisions is the threshold showing of harm required before state action will
be deemed a justified intrusion into family life."375 The suggestion that some
undefined "potential harm" or "threatened harm" will suffice when a fit parent
is no longer a partner in an intact family surely does not satisfy the required
compelling state interest that will warrant overriding the constitutionally
protected privacy right of a fit parent. 76
369. Id. at 54-55.
370. Id. at 55.
371. Id. at 59.
372. Id.
373. Id. (citing Edward M. Bums, Grandparent Visitation Rights: Is it Time for the
Pendulum to Fall?, 25 FAM. L.Q. 59, 80 (1991)).
374. See supra notes 247-59 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court's protec-
tion of parental authority).
375. Greene, supra note 364, at 57. State court decisions also recognize, as they must, this
implicit requirement of the Supreme Court's decisions. See Brooks v. Parkerson, 454 S.E.2d
769, 772 (Ga. 1995) (observing that "Supreme Court has made clear that state interference with
a parent's right to raise children is justifiable only where the state acts in its police power to
protect the child's health or welfare, and where parental decisions in the area would result in
harm to the child"); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993) (noting that "[flederal
cases ... clearly require that some harm threaten a child's welfare before the state may constitu-
tionally interfere with a parent's right to rear his or her child").
376. Cf Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,434 (1984) (holding thatEqual Protection Clause
55 WASH. & LEE L. REV 351 (1998)
No constitutional doctrine justifies limiting recognition and protection
of parental authority to married parents in intact families and denying the
same protection and recognition to natural parents who are entirely fit but are
unmarried. The decisions of the Supreme Court that first established a right
to family privacy are illustrative.3" In Griswold v. Connecticut78 the Court
struck down a state statute proscribing the use of contraception by married
couples.3 79 As Professor Janet L. Dolgin notes, the Court "found the origins
of the constitutional right to privacy" in two of its earlier decisions, Meyer v.
Nebraska and Pierce v. Society of Sisters.380
Seven years after the Griswold decision, in Eisenstadt v. Baird,38 the
Court extended its privacy protection to unmarried persons by striking down
a Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of contraceptives only
to married persons except upon a doctor's prescription." 2 Holding that the
statute violated the equal protection rights of unmarried persons, the Court
stated: "Ifthe right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual,
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear
or beget a child." '83 This history provides additional support for the conclu-
sion that no valid basis supports a constitutional distinction that would protect
intact families while permitting the intrusion into the child rearing preroga-
tives of a fit, unmarried parent.
Professor Laurence Nolan provides an additional reason for skepticism
about limiting the proscription of grandparent visitation to intact families.3
Professor Nolan speculates that prohibiting visitation in intact families but
permitting it in families that are not intact may constitute unconstitutional
discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.385 She states:
forbade removal of child residing in racially mixed household from custody of fit mother). "The
question.., is whether the reality of private biases and the possible injury they might inflict are
permissible considerations for removal of an infant child from the custody of its natural mother.
We have little difficulty concluding that they are not." Id. at 433.
377. See generally Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition: From Griswold to Eisen-
stadt and Beyond, 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1540-46 (1994).
378. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
379. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
380. Dolgin, supra note 377, at 1536 n. 83; see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510,
534-35 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-400 (1923); see supra notes 249-59
(discussing Meyer and Pierce).
381. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
382. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972).
383. Id. at 453.




All grandparent visitation cases impinge upon the fundamental right of
child rearing. When a classification intrudes upon the fundamental right
of childrearing, state regulation limiting the right is unconstitutional if it is
not justified by a compelling state interest and the regulation is not nar-
rowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. 6
Application of a single standard in grandparent visitation cases, which Profes-
sor Nolan suggests would avoid the equal protection issue, also promises to
go far toward clarifying and settling the uncertain, and unprincipled, state of
the law with respect to visitation by other legal strangers. 7 Much support
exists for a recommendation to adopt a standard that recognizes the once
sacrosanct authority of parents to make decisions with respect to the control
and care of their children. The standard flows, of course, from the long
standing and thus far unrefuted assumption that parents generally act in their
children's best interests. Absent a showing of significant harm to a particular
child, the child rearing decisions of a fit natural parent deserve respect.
Acknowledgment of the primacy of a fit parent's authority to raise her
child and choose the child's associates will significantly harness the opportu-
nity for virtually unlimited judicial discretion that the best interest standard
provides. It promises to dampen any inclination of judges to prefer "those
litigants whose attributes and values most resemble their own, 388 or to give
"inappropriate expression to personal or sexist biases 389 in visitation and
custody decisions.
A standard that recognizes parental authority will stall judicial incursions
into legislative prerogatives by the at least questionable invocation of equita-
ble powers.3 ° Further, this standard will render irrelevant the urging of those
academic commentators who would so redefine parent and family as to
infringe upon the traditional and appropriately recognized child rearing
prerogatives of fit natural parents. 9 ' Such redefinitions could, as the Cali-
fornia Court of Appeal presciently observed in Nancy S. v. Michele G.,
386. Id
387. Id; see Walther, supra note 283, at 97 (explaining that " [i]f grandparents had standing
to petition for visitation only under special circumstances, but not when the family is intact, then
the grandparents of intact families are being treated differently under the law from grandparents
of broken families. This disparate treatment may be a violation of the equal protection clause")
(footnotes omitted)).
388. See Levy, supra note 270, at 197.
389. See Chambers, supra note 272, at481.
390. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419,435 (Wis. 1995) (invoking court's
equitable power to hear visitation petition). But see Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689-90
(Vt. 1997) (finding that court cannot hear visitation or custody claims absent common law or
legislative authorization).
391. See supra notes 176-245 and accompanying text (discussing views of commentators
who urge redefinition of family).
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expose other natural parents to litigation brought by child-care providers
of long standing, relatives, successive sets of stepparents or other close
friends of the family. No matter how narrowly we might attempt to draft
the definition, the fact remains that the status of individuals claiming to be
parents would have to be litigated and resolution of these claims would
turn on elusive factual determinations of the intent of the natural mother,
the perceptions of the children, and the course of conduct of the party
claiming parental status."l
Certainly, the prospect of interminable litigation by third parties over child
visitation cannot be in the best interests of children under any view of that
standard.
Simply stated, the standard proposed in this Article gives a child's
natural parent the authority to decide when and whether to grant or deny the
right of visitation to a grandparent, a stepparent, a so-called coparent, or any
other legal stranger. Protection of family autonomy and parental authority
reflects a presumption that when fit natural parents make fundamental deci-
sions affecting their children, they are acting in the best interests of those
children. Accordingly, parental decisions relating to visitation, like other
decisions involving their children, deserve respect of a high order. Only in the
rare case of demonstrable harm or danger to a child should the law permit
judicial contravention of a parent's decision about third party visitation. This
approach protects children and families and is constitutionally sound.
392. Nancy S. v. Michelle G., 279 Cal. Rptr. 212, 219 (Ct. App. 1991).
